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 No man can serve two masters: for either he will hate the one, 
and love the other; or else he will hold to one, and despise the 
other.1 
                                                                                                                    
 * Assistant Professor of Law, The Dickinson School of Law of the Pennsylvania 
State University. B.A., East Texas State University, 1989; J.D., Howard University School 
of Law, 1992. I am grateful to my colleagues at Dickinson School of Law for their insightful 
and thought-provoking comments after I presented the idea for this paper to the faculty. I 
would like to convey special thanks to Dean Peter Glenn for the research grant that sup-
ported this work and to Peter Alexander, Larry Backer, David Richman, Victor Romero, 
and Laurel Terry for their thoughtful comments and suggestions. I also wish to express 
appreciation for the opportunity to present this paper at an Ethics Conference at Ship-
pensburg University and at the Mid-Atlantic People of Color Scholarship Conference at 
Georgetown University Law Center. The dialogue at each conference was thought-
provoking and contributed to shaping the thoughts presented in this paper. I would also 
like to extend my gratitude to Colleen Grygier, Jane Smedley, and Regina Ross for their 
able research assistance. Finally, I thank my husband, Michael, who supported me and en-
couraged me to write this Article despite the inherent vulnerability that is associated with 
being the “underdog.” This Article is dedicated to our children, Payton and Christopher, 
who I hope will grow up with a system of justice free from the infestation of racism. 
 1. Matthew 6:24 (King James). I thank Derrick Bell for his essay, which focused my 
attention on this verse. See Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Serving Two Masters: Integration Ideals 
and Client Interests in School Desegregation Litigation, 85 YALE L.J. 470 (1976). 
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I.   INTRODUCTION 
 Within the legal community, it is often said that there are certain 
core values of the legal profession: loyalty, confidentiality and compe-
tence.2 Often overlooked, but recognized by some, is the core value of 
justice.3 From our history, which includes the drafting of our Consti-
tution, are derived two core values that serve as the cornerstones of 
our system of justice, which necessarily includes the legal profession 
since it has the monopolistic privilege of administering justice.4 
Those core values are fairness and the notion of equal justice for all.5 
Equal justice is a core value of the legal profession6 because history 
demonstrates that without a commitment to this value, our legal sys-
tem will commit atrocities against the powerless and the oppressed. 
Without a commitment to equal justice, lawyers are empowered to 
commit the racist mistakes of past administration of justice to our 
                                                                                                                    
 2. Allison Marston, Guiding the Profession: The 1887 Code of Ethics of the Alabama 
State Bar Association, 49 ALA. L. REV. 471, 498 n.161 (1998) (citing Geoffrey C. Hazard, 
Jr., The Future of Legal Ethics, 100 YALE L.J. 1239, 1246 (1991)); see also Direction of Le-
gal Profession is Debated at Multi-disciplinary Panel Hearings, in LAWYERS MANUAL ON 
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 45 (ABA/BNA eds., 1999) (wherein Lawrence Fox discusses the 
core values of the legal profession in the multi-disciplinary practice (“MDP”) context). 
 3. See Robert L. Nelson, The Futures of American Lawyers: A Demographic Profile of 
a Changing Profession in a Changing Society, 44 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 345, 384 (1994) (ar-
guing that the core value around which the legal profession should be organized is justice); 
see also Judith L. Maute, Pro Bono Publico in Oklahoma: Time For Change, 53 OKLA. L. 
REV. 527, 549 n.123 (2000) (citing Conference Report: ABA Mid-Year Meeting, 69 U.S.L.W. 
2042 (U.S. July 18, 2000), in proposing that equal access to justice and pro bono services 
are core values of the legal profession). 
 4. It could be argued that a lawyer administers justice any time the lawyer acts in a 
capacity which constitutes the practice of law because the lawyer’s role arguably affects 
the outcome for the client and therefore affects the “justice” that the client receives.  I 
would probably define the term “administering justice” more narrowly to include functions 
wherein the lawyer is empowered with the ability to make decisions that could negatively 
impact those persons seeking justice.  Lawyers administer justice in many ways, including 
but not limited to selecting jurors in voir dire, performing the function of civil or criminal 
prosecutor on behalf of the government, and/or serving as judge, arbitrator or mediator. 
 5. I use the term “equal justice” not merely as a reference to equal access to our sys-
tem of justice, but as a reference to the underlying premise that all persons subject to the 
jurisdiction of our system of justice are entitled to fairness and equal treatment in the ad-
ministration of the law regardless of, for example, race or socioeconomic background. The 
preamble to the MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, as revised by the Ethics 2000 
Commission and adopted by the ABA House of Delegates at its February 2002 meeting, 
supports this contention by providing that “all lawyers should devote professional time and 
resources and use civic influence to ensure equal access to our system of justice for all 
those who, because of economic or social barriers, cannot afford or secure adequate legal 
counsel.” MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT pmbl. (2001). 
 6. The ABA has intimated that equal justice is a core value of the profession by 
adopting a resolution in response to the multi-disciplinary practice (MDP) controversy. The 
resolution acknowledges the obvious core values of client loyalty, independent professional 
judgment, confidentiality, and competence, while also acknowledging as a core value of the 
profession “the lawyer’s duty . . . [as] an officer of the legal system, and a public citizen 
having special responsibility for the quality of justice.” ABA House of Delegates, Revised 
Resolution 10F (July 2000), available at http://www.abanet.org/cpr/mdprecom10f.html (last 
visited Mar. 15, 2003) (on file with author) (emphasis added).  
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minority population. A commitment to equal justice is important to 
the professional role of a lawyer because without it lawyers will be 
perceived as biased and unfair administrators of justice who will 
threaten the orderly administration of justice by causing the public 
to question the integrity of the entire judicial system. Justice is not a 
commodity for only the majoritarian group;7 it is for all. Hence in or-
der to be a lawyer, one must be committed to justice for all regardless 
of race. The thesis of this Article is that in order to possess the requi-
site moral character to be an officer of the court and an administrator 
of justice, also known as a lawyer or attorney, an individual must 
subscribe to the core value of equal justice that serves as a corner-
stone of our entire system of justice. Members of any group advocat-
ing racial caste systems, including but not limited to white suprema-
cists,8 do not subscribe to these core values because they do not be-
lieve that all people are entitled to fairness and equal justice without 
regard to their race. White supremacists believe that justice is a 
commodity that only the whitest of white people should enjoy.9 
 Being a legal realist, I too believe that the world in which we live 
and practice “law” is a nomos contextualized by the narratives that 
locate law and give it meaning.10 The genre of narrative that locates 
                                                                                                                    
 7. I use this term, as many scholars have, to mean the racial majority, which in this 
country happens to be “white people.” The definition of “whiteness” has evolved with our 
culture. For an understanding of who historically has been considered white and who today 
is considered white, see JUAN F. PEREA ET AL., RACE AND RACES: CASES AND RESOURCES 
FOR A DIVERSE AMERICA 429-54 (2000). 
 8. I use the term “white supremacist” to refer to an array of groups and individuals 
who include, but are not necessarily limited to, Nazis, Skinheads, Klansmen, and the like. 
The white supremacist is an individual who views non-whites and Jewish people as the 
enemy and who believes that whites are inherently superior to non-whites. The white su-
premacist rhetoric and propaganda describe a disdain for non-whites that is nothing short 
of hatred and suggest an extreme social, economic, and often times violent agenda for the 
genocide of such groups. For readings on white supremacy, see JOHN GEORGE & LAIRD 
WILCOX, AMERICAN EXTREMISTS (1996) and JAMES RIDGEWAY, BLOOD IN THE FACE: THE 
KU KLUX KLAN, ARYAN NATIONS, NAZI SKINHEADS, AND THE RISE OF A NEW WHITE 
CULTURE (2d ed. 1995). 
 9. White supremacists believe that, despite the white appearance of one’s skin, a 
scintilla of non-white blood renders the person in question a “mongrel” and hence inferior 
to those who are “lily white.” See BEN KLASSEN, 1 NATURE’S ETERNAL RELIGION: THE 
UNAVENGED OUTRAGE (1992) (see Chapter 5, entitled The Black Plague in Our Midst), 
available at http://www.rahowa.com/ner.htm (last visited Mar. 26, 2002) (on file with au-
thor). 
 10. Robert M. Cover, The Supreme Court 1982 Term: Foreword: Nomos and Narra-
tive, 97 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1983). Robert Cover defines “nomos” as a “normative universe” 
where we continually “create and maintain a world of right and wrong,” partially through 
rules of law. Id. at 4. Law is not created in the abstract and accordingly cannot be con-
structed or examined in the abstract, but rather must be contextualized by history and/or 
present culture. See Larry Cata Backer, Culturally Significant Speech: Law, Courts, Soci-
ety, and Racial Equity, 21 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 845, 869 n.95 (1999) (citing Larry 
Cata Backer, Chroniclers in the Field of Cultural Production: Courts, Law and the Inter-
pretive Process, 20 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 291 (2000), which discusses how court-made law 
is produced by culture); see also Mari J. Matsuda, Looking to the Bottom: Critical Legal 
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our civil rights and equal protection jurisprudence in this country is 
history, and our history regrettably incorporates the narrative of ra-
cism. Although racism is an ancient concept that long pre-dates the 
birth of our United States Constitution,11 American racism is a 
unique narrative. Our long history of racism needs not to be recapitu-
lated here in order to be accepted and understood as an integral part 
of our contemporary view of law and culture. Suffice it to say that our 
nation embraced the notion of racial inferiority for generations, and 
upon attempting to correct its evil mistake, organizations such as the 
infamous Ku Klux Klan (hereinafter “KKK”) were formed in an effort 
to maintain the status quo of white privilege and to resist the ever-
evolving political, social and jurisprudential trend toward racial 
equality.12 
 In addition to the KKK, various other groups have perpetuated 
                                                                                                                    
Studies and Reparations, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 323, 324-25 (1987), reprinted in 
KIMBERLÉ CRENSHAW ET AL., CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE KEY WRITINGS THAT FORMED 
THE MOVEMENT 63 (1995) (arguing that law ought to be based on the actual history, cul-
ture, and experience of people of color).  
 11. See DINESH D’SOUZA, THE END OF RACISM 62-63 (1995) (arguing Enlightenment 
thinkers such as Hume, Voltaire, and Kant expressed racist views). 
 12. There are conflicting stories about why and when the KKK was founded. See 
THOMAS F. GOSSETT, RACE: THE HISTORY OF AN IDEA IN AMERICA 259-60 (1997) (proclaim-
ing that the KKK was founded in 1867 by young men who desired to visit their sweet-
hearts dressed like knights and who merely by happenstance discovered that this garb 
frightened blacks). Nevertheless, suffice it to say that the KKK emerged as a racist terror 
organization after the Civil War during the period of Reconstruction (1865-76). See Ku 
Klux Klan History, at http://www.kukluxklan.org/history2.html (last visited Mar. 15, 
2003). The Klan describes itself as a Christian organization that strives to maintain the 
God-given supremacy of the White Race. Id. Although its website reveals a rather trans-
parent attempt to sanitize the public image of the organization, the Klan is notorious for 
its historical and contemporary acts of hatred, violence, terrorism, and intimidation di-
rected toward people of color. For some relatively recent criminal activities of the Klan, see 
Eric Lichtblau, Klansman to Apologize for Harassment Law, L.A. TIMES, May 12, 2000, at 
A19 (reporting that Roy Frankhouser, Klansman and former grand dragon of the 
Pennsylvania KKK, engaged in months of harassing and intimidating conduct directed at a 
woman who was a fair-housing activist and mother of a bi-racial child). See also Pierre 
Thomas, Klan Members Face Federal Charges in Church Burning,  WASH. POST, July 9, 
1996, at A3 (reporting that two KKK members were charged with the burning of the 
Mount Zion African Methodist Episcopal Church in Greeleyville, South Carolina). The two 
men described in the Washington Post article later pled guilty to civil rights violations, ar-
son, and other charges in connection with the burning of the AME church in Greeleyville 
and the Macedonia Baptist Church in Bloomville, South Carolina, and they also admitted 
to attacking a black man during the same month that they burned the churches. See Ex-
Klansmen Admit Guilt in Church Fires, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 15, 1996, at A27; see also Former 
Klan Member sentenced to 26 years, HERALD (Rock Hill, S.C.), Sept. 30, 1998, at A10 [here-
inafter Nightclub Shooting] (reporting that Klansman Joshua Grant England admitted to 
shooting three African-American teenagers with a semi-automatic rifle outside a nightclub 
in Pelron, South Carolina, after leaving a rally of the Ku Klux Klan). England and Clayton 
Spires, his co-conspirator, were members of the same Klan group whose members were 
prosecuted two years earlier for civil rights and firearms violations arising out of the inves-
tigation into church arsons in South Carolina. Id. 
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the cultural myth of white supremacy. Christian Identity,13 Aryan 
Nation, and Skinheads are but a few of the better-known organized 
groups that profess white supremacy and disdain for all non-white 
and Jewish people.14 Perhaps less well-known is The World Church of 
the Creator (“World Church”), which is a largely internet-based or-
ganization that promotes white supremacy.15  
 At the time this Article was written, the World Church was 
headed by Matthew Hale. Hale is a graduate of Southern Illinois 
University School of Law who passed the bar examination and ap-
plied for admission to the Illinois bar.16 Despite his successful per-
formance in both law school and on the bar exam, Hale was denied 
admission to the Illinois bar because of a finding by bar authorities 
                                                                                                                    
 13. Christian Identity is actually a white supremacist movement uniting several 
white supremacist groups such as Scriptures for America, The Jubilee, the American Nazi 
Party and the Confederate Hammerskins. See Christian Identity Movement, at 
http://www.religioustolerance.org/cr_ident.htm (last visited Mar. 26, 2003) (on file with au-
thor).  
 14. See VINCENT COPPOLA, DRAGONS OF GOD: A JOURNEY THROUGH FAR-RIGHT 
AMERICA (1996) (describing several white supremacist groups and their racist ideology and 
activities). 
 15. Members of the World Church subscribe to 16 “religious” commandments, and 
among them are the following: 
  IV. The guiding principle of all of your actions shall be: What is best for the 
White Race? 
  . . . .  
   VI. Your first loyalty belongs to the White Race. 
 . . . .  
  VII. Show preferential treatment in business dealings to members of your 
own race. Phase out all dealings with Jews as soon as possible. Do not employ 
niggers or other coloreds. 
THE WORLD CHURCH OF THE CREATOR MEMBERSHIP MANUAL, available at 
http://www.creator.org/manual (last visited Mar. 16, 2003). “[W]hat is good for the White 
Race is the highest virtue, and what is bad for the White Race is the ultimate sin.” Id. 
Although Hale’s public speeches as head of the organization outwardly condemn violence 
against non-white people, he does threaten that violence will erupt if his organization and 
its beliefs are not heeded. For example, after being denied membership to the Illinois bar 
and prior to his appeal to the Illinois Supreme Court, Hale stated, “If the courthouse is 
closed to Non Approved Religions, America can only be headed for violence.” See Press Re-
lease, Illinois State Bar Forbids Freedom of Speech and Religion! (July 5, 1999) (on file 
with author) (quoting Hale). Indeed, two days after Hale was denied admission to the bar, 
Benjamin Nathaniel Smith, who had been a member of Hale’s World Church, went on a 
weekend shooting spree of non-whites in Illinois and Indiana, killing two people before kill-
ing himself. See Mark Skertic & Abdon M. Pallasch, Spree Ends, Alleged Gunman Kills 
Self Near Salem, Ill., CHI. SUN-TIMES, July 5, 1999, at 1. After the killings, Hale said that 
it was possible that the shootings were the result of the character and fitness committee’s 
denial of his application for a license to practice law. See Court rejects Hale’s appeal for law 
license, ST. J.-REG. (Springfield, Ill.), June 27, 2000, at 9. In an interview documented on 
videotape by the Southern Poverty Law Center, Matthew Hale expressed no regret or 
sympathy for this loss of non-white life. For more information on the World Church’s racist 
propaganda, see Richard L. Sloane, Note, Barbarian at the Gates: Revisiting the Case of 
Matthew F. Hale to Reaffirm that Character and Fitness Evaluations Appropriately Pre-
clude Racists from the Practice of Law, 15 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 397, 418-20 (2002). 
 16. Hale passed the Illinois Bar examination in the summer of 1998. 
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that his racist activities both prior to and during his leadership of the 
World Church demonstrated a lack of moral character, rendering 
Hale unfit to practice law.17 In the judgment of this author, In Re 
Hale18 was correctly decided, and it stands for the proposition that 
the bar may legitimately exclude a person from the legal profession if 
that person participates in racist activities because such activities 
obstruct the administration of justice and undermine the core values 
of the legal profession. Nonetheless, the Hale decision has been 
widely criticized as abridging First Amendment rights.19 It is because 
                                                                                                                    
 17. On December 16, 1998, the Illinois Bar Inquiry Panel refused to certify that Hale 
had the necessary moral character and fitness to practice law. Hale appealed the Inquiry 
Panel’s decision to the Illinois Committee on Character and Fitness (“Committee”), which 
reviewed Hale’s application and, after a hearing, concluded that Hale failed to meet the re-
quirement of “good moral character and general fitness to practice law” as that require-
ment has been interpreted in Illinois. See GEOFFREY C. HAZARD ET AL., THE LAW AND 
ETHICS OF LAWYERING 875-84 (3d ed. 1999) (reporting the Committee’s opinion). Hale ap-
pealed the Committee’s decision to the Supreme Court of the State of Illinois, which dis-
missed the appeal. In re Hale, 723 N.E.2d 206 (Ill. 1999). He subsequently filed a petition 
for certiorari to the United States Supreme Court, which was denied without opinion. Hale 
v. Comm. on Character & Fitness of the Ill. Bar, 530 U.S. 1261 (2000). The decision to deny 
Hale admission to the bar could have been based on the fact that Hale failed to disclose on 
his application several arrests and disciplinary actions taken against him. See Bob Van 
Voris, Muddying the Waters: Illinois Racist’s Free Speech Case is Complicated by His Arrest 
Record, NAT’L L.J., Feb. 21, 2000, at A1. Failure to disclose information in a bar applica-
tion can and has served as the basis for denying admission. See, e.g., In re Florida Bd. of 
Bar Exm’rs ex rel. John Doe, 770 So. 2d 670 (Fla. 2000) (denying admission to Florida bar 
for an applicant’s failure to disclose pending criminal charges); In re Cunningham, 502 
N.W.2d 53 (Minn. 1993) (denying admission to the Minnesota bar for an applicant’s failure 
to disclose an arrest and paternity proceedings). Moreover, the committee could have cited 
poor judgment as demonstrated by a letter Hale sent to a woman expressing the opinion 
that the “nigger race” is “inferior” and inquiring, “Is it going to take your rape at the hands 
of a nigger beast or your murder before you become aware of the problem?” See Brief of 
Amicus Curiae Illinois State Bar Association at 8-9, In re Hale, 723 N.E.2d 206 (Ill. 1999), 
cert. denied, 530 U.S. 1261 (2000) (on file with author). Despite the existence of sufficient 
“benign” reasons to deny Hale admission, the Illinois Inquiry Panel chose to focus on the 
more disturbing aspect of Hale’s application—the fact that he was an admitted white su-
premacist. For a detailed reporting of the facts and circumstances surrounding Hale’s de-
nial of admission to the bar, see Emelie E. East, Note, The Case of Matthew F. Hale: Impli-
cations for First Amendment Rights, Social Mores and the Direction of Bar Examiners in 
an Era of Intolerance of Hatred, 13 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 741 (2000). Unlike the cited 
piece, the instant Article focuses on the ethics of allowing a white supremacist to practice 
law and offers a legal rationale to support the ethical conclusion.  
 18. 723 N.E.2d 206 (Ill. 1999), cert. denied, 530 U.S. 1261 (2000). 
 19. See W. Bradley Wendel, Free Speech for Lawyers, 28 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 305, 
320 (2001) (discussing the application of free speech principles to the legal profession and 
arguing that anti-discrimination values should not be preferred to First Amendment val-
ues). Wendel acknowledges the odious nature of Hale’s belief in white supremacy, but ar-
gues that these beliefs are constitutionally protected. Id.; see also W. William Hodes, Ac-
cepting and Rejecting Clients—The Moral Autonomy of the Second-to-the-Last Lawyer in 
Town, 48 U. KAN. L. REV. 977, 988-89 (2000) (acknowledging that he has criticized the 
Hale decision as implicating the First Amendment); Nadine Strossen, Incitement to Ha-
tred: Should There Be a Limit?, 25 S. ILL. U. L.J. 243 (2001) (arguing that the First 
Amendment precludes bar authorities from discriminating against persons who express 
racist views). 
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of this criticism that I feel compelled to write this Article.20 
 This Article explores the issue of whether Klansmen or other 
white supremacists should be lawyers. It contends that white su-
premacists should not be lawyers and uses the example of Matthew 
Hale to illustrate its points. To make its case, this Article looks first 
in Part II to the definition of moral character in an effort to deter-
mine whether white supremacists such as Matthew Hale possess the 
requisite moral character to be lawyers. Parts II.A and B examine 
cases in which candidates for admission to the bar have been denied 
admission on the basis of moral character in an effort to locate the 
rationale for the moral character requirement. It argues that this ra-
tionale is furthered by the exclusion of white supremacists such as 
Hale from the bar. Part II also looks to relevant case law to deter-
mine whether there is precedent for holding an applicant morally un-
fit to practice law because of conduct that is arguably protected by 
the First Amendment. In doing so, Part II.C argues for a balanced 
application of the First Amendment by balancing the state’s interest 
in providing a system of justice free from racism against the individ-
ual’s free speech interests. It also argues for harmonization of the 
competing interests of First Amendment liberty with Fourteenth 
Amendment protections in the bar admission context. 
 Next, Part II.D looks at the “professional role obligations”21 of law-
yers and asks whether a white supremacist like Hale can meet the 
obligations of the profession while practicing his racist “religion” or 
beliefs. It explores several additional questions. May an applicant’s 
personal moral code in any way contradict the profession’s code of 
ethics? May an applicant’s political and/or religious beliefs and/or 
agenda be contrary to existing law? Part III seeks to distinguish the 
rest of us from the white supremacists in an effort to explain why 
many candidates, despite their beliefs and biases, meet the moral 
character requirement while others do not. Part IV proffers a policy 
rationale for the Hale decision and contends that the profession 
would be harmed by the admission of white supremacists. To make 
this case, Part V argues that the admission of a person to the bar 
who does not subscribe to the core value of equality would illegiti-
                                                                                                                    
 20. Since his denial of admission in Illinois, Hale has been on a forum-shopping spree 
and has sought admission in Montana and Ohio, both of which denied his application. See 
Anderson v. Hale, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3774 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 29, 2001) (mentioning Hale’s 
denial of admission in Montana in late March 2001). Although no jurisdiction had admit-
ted Hale at the time this Article was nearing completion, the potential remains for Hale or 
other white supremacists to be admitted to the bar either because the white supremacist 
does not have a record containing sufficient grounds for denial that are unrelated to beliefs 
or because the jurisdiction in question views the First Amendment as an obstacle to pre-
cluding admission of an open racist. 
 21. David B. Wilkins, Identities and Roles: Race, Recognition, and Professional Re-
sponsibility, 57 MD. L. REV. 1502, 1579-80 (1998). 
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mize a fundamental principle of our system of justice: the task of 
administering equal justice to all. 
 Part VI acknowledges that there are cases in which the applica-
tion of the proposed rationale of Parts II and III would be more diffi-
cult than it was in the Hale case. It discusses those difficult cases 
and seeks to distinguish or harmonize the more difficult cases with 
the Hale decision. Part VI acknowledges that the term “racist” is de-
fined according to degree. Ultimately, Part VI seeks to deconstruct 
discourses of racism and racist identity in a critical manner to clarify 
the complex relationship between the two and to identify how racist 
lawyers or bar applicants should be identified and treated by bar au-
thorities to best further the principles of the profession. 
 This Article attempts to provide a basis for removing from racism 
the veil of protection it sometimes has received from the First 
Amendment in the bar admission context. 
II.   DEFINING MORAL CHARACTER AND FITNESS 
 White supremacists lack the requisite moral character and fitness 
to be lawyers. All United States jurisdictions require that applicants 
for admission to the bar possess and demonstrate good moral charac-
ter.22 The issue of whether a candidate for admission to the bar is of 
good moral character is an important one given the degree of discre-
tion that lawyers inevitably exercise in even the most routine of law 
practices.23 Good moral character is required of lawyers in order to 
protect the orderly administration of justice.24 “Since our ‘fortunes, 
reputations, domestic peace . . . nay, our liberty and life itself’ rest in 
the hands of legal advocates, ‘[t]heir character must be not only 
without a stain, but without suspicion.’”25 The moral character re-
quirement is intended to ensure that the applicant, if admitted to the 
bar, would not obstruct the administration of justice or otherwise act 
unscrupulously in his or her capacity as an officer of the court.26  
 Good moral character—what does that mean?27 The inherent prob-
                                                                                                                    
 22. Michael K. McChrystal, A Structural Analysis of the Good Moral Character Re-
quirement for Bar Admission, 60 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 67 (1984) (citing RULES FOR ADMIS-
SION TO THE BAR IN THE UNITED STATES AND TERRITORIES (West 1982)). Good moral char-
acter is required by law in other contexts as well. For example, immigration law requires 
that noncitizens possess good moral character in order to obtain relief from deportability. 
See STEPHEN H. LEGOMSKY, IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE LAW AND POLICY (3d ed. 2002). 
 23. Mark Neal Aaronson, Be Just to One Another: Preliminary Thoughts On Civility, 
Moral Character, and Professionalism, 8 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 113, 122 (1995). 
 24. Ex Parte Wall, 107 U.S. 265, 274 (1883); see also Hallinan v. Comm. of Bar 
Exam’rs, 421 P.2d 76, 87 (Cal. 1966). 
 25. Deborah L. Rhode, Moral Character as a Professional Credential, 94 YALE L.J. 
491, 507-08 (1985). 
 26. Hallinan, 421 P.2d at 87. 
 27. For a brief history of the “good moral character” requirement and an argument in 
favor of its retention, see Sloane, supra note 15, an article that focuses solely on the Hale 
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lem with assessing moral character in any instance is that there is 
no firm definition of the term. The concept is fluid and quite subjec-
tive.28 Conduct that may demonstrate to one individual that the ap-
plicant lacks moral character will have little or no significance in an-
other person’s analysis of whether the applicant has the requisite 
moral character to be a lawyer.29 Reasonable minds can disagree 
about what constitutes “moral character.”30 Any person who know-
ingly and intentionally practices racism lacks moral character be-
cause racism31 is immoral.32 Assuming reasonable minds can agree on 
what type of conduct is immoral, the inquiry does not stop there. 
Adultery is immoral behavior, but if it were used as a litmus test for 
disqualifying bar applicants and practicing lawyers, there would be a 
significant decrease in the number of lawyers. Accordingly, not all 
immoral behavior serves as a disqualifier for purposes of determining 
bar admission. So what type of immoral conduct is acceptable in law-
yers and what type is not?  
 Courts have offered some guidance in defining and applying the 
amorphous criterion of moral character.33 In order for behavior that 
society characterizes as immoral to become relevant to bar authori-
ties, there must be a nexus between the alleged immoral behavior 
and the practice of law.34 In other words, if the immoral behavior will 
not reflect adversely on the person’s fitness to practice law, then it is 
                                                                                                                    
case. This article uses the Hale case to construct a framework for discussion of the larger 
questions underlying the Hale case in an effort to aid in the analysis of future cases similar 
to Hale. 
 28. Rhode, supra note 25, at 529.  
 29. Id. at 530-31. 
 30. Id. at 507. 
 31. Defining racism is beyond the scope of this Article. However, I use the term to en-
compass racist beliefs (the belief that a person’s race makes that person inferior to other 
people) that necessarily determine one’s practices and behavior and thereby render the lat-
ter action racist. For a discussion of the definition of racism, see PEREA ET AL., supra note 
7, at 6-49. 
 32. See Dr. Martin Luther King Jr., Letter From Birmingham Jail (Apr. 16, 1963), 
available at http://www.mlkonline.com/jail.html (last visited Mar. 16, 2003) (arguing that 
racism in the form of segregation is morally wrong); see also HAZARD ET AL., supra note 17, 
at 878 n.4 (citing In re A.L., 702 N.E.2d 1021, 1024-25 (Ill. App. Ct. 1998), in which “the 
Appellate Court cited bigotry as evidence of depravity which has been defined as the oppo-
site of good moral character,” and In re Abdullah, 423 N.E.2d 915, 917 (Ill. 1981), which 
held that “depravity is ‘an inherent deficiency of moral sense and rectitude’”); Charles R. 
Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 
39 STAN. L. REV. 317, 322-23 (1987) (discussing how society has come to accept the idea 
that racism is immoral). 
 33. It is also important to note that the applicant bears the burden of proving that she 
is of good moral character, so if the applicant fails to meet this burden of proof, denial of 
admission to the bar is appropriate. Konigsberg v. State Bar of Cal., 366 U.S. 36, 40-41 
(1961). 
 34. In re Eimers, 358 So. 2d 7, 10 (Fla. 1978) (holding that while homosexuality “af-
fronts public conventions,” there is no substantial nexus between homosexual acts and the 
ability of the applicant to live up to the professional responsibility and conduct required of 
a lawyer). 
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not the type of immoral conduct that disqualifies a candidate from 
bar admission.35 For example, adultery, although still considered 
immoral behavior in our society, does not reflect adversely on a can-
didate’s fitness to practice law—one can be an adulterer and a com-
petent and effective lawyer at the same time. Unlike adultery, the 
practice of racism is a type of immoral behavior that is integrally 
connected to the practice of law. A lawyer who commits adultery in 
no way harms his clients, the profession, or his ability to provide 
competent and loyal representation.36 On the other hand, a lawyer 
who practices racism is likely to harm non-white clients either by re-
fusing them representation or providing them with less than loyal 
and competent representation through reduced zeal caused by his 
personal conflict of interest arising from racism. A lawyer who prac-
tices racism is also likely to have a detrimental impact on the public 
image of the profession. Members of the public, particularly minority 
members, will likely view our system of justice as less fair if it is ad-
ministered by racially biased lawyers and judges.37  
 In Konigsberg v. State Bar of California,38 the United States Su-
preme Court defined the parameters of the moral character inquiry 
as seeking to determine whether “a reasonable [person] could fairly 
find that there were substantial doubts about [an applicant’s] ‘hon-
esty, fairness and respect for the rights of others and for the laws of 
the state and nation.’”39 Admittedly, the moral character requirement 
is a subjective standard for determining fitness to practice law. Most 
bar admission cases that seek to determine moral character fall 
within one or more of the following categories: political/religious be-
lief and conduct; “misconduct in the bar admission process; past ille-
gal conduct; financial malfeasance; and emotional or mental instabil-
ity.”40 Both past illegal conduct and misconduct in the bar admission 
process are non-controversial factors that routinely have been used 
as a basis for determining that a candidate does not possess the req-
uisite moral character for admission to the bar. Factors that indicate 
that a candidate is dishonest are generally agreed upon as legitimate 
grounds for denial of membership to the bar. The more controversial 
factors that bar authorities have used to reach the conclusion that an 
applicant does not possess the requisite moral character include 
                                                                                                                    
 35. In re Haukebo, 352 N.W.2d 752, 754-55 (Minn. 1984). 
 36. This statement assumes, of course, that the lawyer’s accomplice/partner in the 
adulterous act is not his/her client. 
 37. Indeed, a recent American Bar Association report on perceptions of the United 
States justice system reveals that non-whites perceive our system of justice as failing to 
treat whites and non-whites equally. See American Bar Association Report On Perceptions 
Of The U.S. Justice System, 62 ALB. L. REV. 1307, 1317 (1999). 
 38. 353 U.S. 252 (1957). 
 39. Id. at 264 
 40. See McChrystal, supra note 22, at 73. 
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membership in controversial organizations41 and repetitive use of 
speech and/or the media to personally attack others.42 These factors 
are controversial because they involve the bar candidate’s exercise of 
First Amendment rights such as the right of association or the right 
to practice one’s religion without governmental intrusion. Thus, 
these factors have provoked disagreement about whether conduct 
that is arguably protected by the First Amendment, such as advocat-
ing and practicing private racism and discrimination, can be consid-
ered by bar authorities in their assessment of an applicant’s moral 
character. This question must be answered in the affirmative if the 
profession is to preserve its integrity and its core values, and thereby 
not to undermine the fair administration of justice.43  
A.   The First Amendment as a Shield, Not a Sword 
 Those who argue that First Amendment rights trump all others, 
frequently referred to as “free speech absolutists,”44 argue that the 
First Amendment guarantees to white supremacists such as Hale the 
right to say whatever they choose and to associate with whomever 
they choose without governmental consequence or punishment. 
Those who adopt this myopic absolutist view are willing to suffer any 
social evil in order to prevent any restriction of speech. Such a view 
stretches the First Amendment beyond its reasonable limits by al-
lowing the First Amendment to subvert other important constitu-
tional guarantees.45 Even acknowledging the individualistic rights-
based stance of American jurisprudence, our Supreme Court has rec-
ognized that the interest in free expression must yield at times to 
other more important considerations. The First Amendment should 
be interpreted as a shield that protects us all,46 not a sword that is 
used to protect some while disemboweling others. Restrictions on the 
                                                                                                                    
 41. Konigsberg v. State Bar of Cal., 366 U.S. 36 (1961) (upholding the denial of ad-
mission of an applicant who argued that the California Bar Commission violated the appli-
cant’s First Amendment rights by forcing him to reveal whether he was affiliated with the 
Communist Party). 
 42. In re Converse, 602 N.W.2d 500 (Neb. 1999) (denying admission to a bar candidate 
due to several instances of using letters, the newspaper, and artwork on t-shirts to person-
ally attack his opponents in disputes). 
 43. At least one court has agreed with this proposition in holding that a bar Commis-
sion may consider conduct arguably protected by the First Amendment when investigating 
whether an applicant possesses the requisite moral character and fitness to practice law. 
Id. 
 44. MARI J. MATSUDA ET AL., WORDS THAT WOUND 11 (1993). 
 45. For an enlightening and prolific argument that the First Amendment is not abso-
lute and should not be used as a sword to permit harm to defenseless people, see id. See 
also RICHARD DELGADO & JEAN STEFANCIC, MUST WE DEFEND NAZIS? (1997). 
 46. I recognize that the First Amendment has been a tool used by minorities for the 
advancement of their interests. Protesters during the Civil Rights movement were to some 
extent protected by the First Amendment. See DERRICK BELL, RACE, RACISM AND 
AMERICAN LAW 653-734 (Chapter 11, entitled Parameters of Racial Protest) (4th ed. 2000). 
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content of speech are imposed when the social value of the speech is 
significantly outweighed by the harm it imposes.47 Such restrictions 
include, but are not limited to, those on child pornography,48 obscen-
ity,49 defamation,50 fighting words,51 sexually harassing speech,52 and 
false or misleading advertising.53 
 In the case of allowing white supremacists into the bar, the value 
of racist speech54 is outweighed by the need to protect minority citi-
zens from the high risk of harm, just as the right of free association 
was outweighed by the interest in racially integrated public schools. 
The First Amendment must be balanced against other competing in-
terests guaranteed by the Constitution. If First Amendment princi-
ples were absolute and could not be balanced against the often com-
peting interest of promoting equal protection under the law, we could 
not have made strides in achieving integrated public schools in this 
country.55 The arguments that free speech absolutists make in oppo-
                                                                                                                    
 47. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942). 
 48. Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103 (1990) (upholding an anti-child pornography stat-
ute that was challenged on First Amendment grounds); see also Victor C. Romero, Restrict-
ing Hate Speech Against “Private Figures”: Lessons in Power-Based Censorship from Defa-
mation Law, 33 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 1, 13 (2001).  
 49. See Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957) (holding that obscenity is not pro-
tected by the First Amendment); see also Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973) (affirming 
the Roth decision that obscenity is not protected by the First Amendment). 
 50. See N.Y. Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (explicating when defamatory 
speech is not protected by the First Amendment); see also Dun & Bradstreet v. Greenmoss 
Builders, 472 U.S. 749 (1985); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974). 
 51. Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 571-72 (upholding a conviction on the ground that fight-
ing words are not protected under the First Amendment). But see Romero, supra note 48, 
at 13 (noting that at least one scholar has argued that Chaplinsky should be overruled by 
citing Note, The Demise of the Chaplinsky Fighting Words Doctrine: An Argument for Its 
Interment, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1129 (1993)).  
 52. Title VII regulations forbid sexually harassing speech, even when unaccompanied 
by conduct, to the extent that such speech creates a hostile work environment for the em-
ployee. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a) (2001). Racist speech in the workplace is also banned to the 
extent that such speech causes a hostile work environment. See Daniels v. Essex Group 
Inc., 937 F.2d 1264 (7th Cir. 1991) (finding that an employee has a cause of action under 
Title VII when persistent racist speech creates a hostile work environment for the em-
ployee); see also Andrews v. City of Philadelphia, 895 F.2d 1469, 1482 (3d Cir. 1990) (list-
ing the elements of a claim for a racially hostile work environment). 
 53. See Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1 (1979) (upholding a provision of the Texas Op-
tometry Act that prohibited the practice of optometry under a trade name and holding that 
the provision did not violate the First Amendment because it furthered the state’s interest 
in protecting the public from deceptive and misleading use of optometric trade names). 
 54. Admittedly, I do not see any value in racist speech, but I use this framework for 
those who do.  
 55. Indeed, Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), demonstrates that any 
First Amendment right of white parents to choose to have their white children associate 
exclusively with other white children must necessarily yield at the point that exercise of 
this First Amendment right tramples the Fourteenth Amendment rights of children of 
color. I do not contend that the mandates of Brown have ever been fully achieved in this 
country, but to the extent that there are no longer positive rules of law that preclude chil-
dren of color from attending predominately “white” public schools, I will acknowledge that 
public schools are integrated at least in theory. For a recent study indicating that segrega-
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sition to the Hale decision are reminiscent of arguments made by op-
ponents of public school integration in the 1950s. During the 1950s, 
those who practiced racial bigotry used First Amendment absolutism 
to argue in favor of continued segregation by claiming that they and 
their children had the First Amendment right to associate or not as-
sociate with persons of their choosing.56 Accordingly, they argued 
that forced integration administered through court orders, busing 
programs, and police escorts violated their First Amendment rights 
to free association.57 Proponents of free speech absolutism argue that 
there should be no government regulation of speech, and to the ex-
tent that regulation is imposed, it should be content-neutral, mean-
ing that the government should not regulate the content of speech or 
impose regulations based on the content of the speech.58 This view 
ignores the harm that a white supremacist is likely to inflict upon 
the legal profession and the administration of justice, not to mention 
our non-white citizens who are subject to our justice system.59 Like 
the majoritarian group, racial minorities have a right to a fair justice 
system that does not make judgments based on race.60  
 First Amendment absolutists give inadequate consideration to the 
nature and degree of harm that is and could be inflicted by the ad-
                                                                                                                    
tion of white and non-white students is on the rise, see Sean F. Reardon et al., The Chang-
ing Structure of School Segregation: Measurement and Evidence of Multiracial Metropoli-
tan-Area School Segregation, 1989-1995, 37 DEMOGRAPHY 351 (2000). See also Sheff v. 
O’Neill, 678 A.2d 1267 (Conn. 1996) (holding that resegregation of Hartford school district 
violated the state’s equal protection clause); Press Release, The Civil Rights Project, Race 
in American Public Schools: Rapidly Resegregating School Districts (Aug. 8, 2002) (report-
ing that segregation in public schools has intensified in the last decade), available at 
http://www.civilrightsproject.harvard.edu/news/pressreleases.php/record_id=9 (last visited 
Mar. 13, 2003) (on file with author).  
 56. Segregationists found support in the writings of constitutional scholar Herbert 
Wechsler. See Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 
HARV. L. REV. 1, 34 (1959) (arguing that integration forces an association upon those who 
find it unpleasant or repugnant). For an extant articulation of the argument that people 
should have an absolute right to not associate, see Robert W. McGee, The Right to Not As-
sociate: The Case for an Absolute Freedom of Negative Association, 23 UWLA L. REV. 123 
(1992). Of course, outside the realm of racial discrimination, the United States Supreme 
Court has recognized that the First Amendment right to free association may trump a 
state’s desire to eliminate sexual orientation discrimination. See, e.g., Boy Scouts of Am. v. 
Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000).  
 57. Wechsler, supra note 56, at 34. 
 58. Lyle Denniston, Absolutism: Unadorned, and Without Apology, 81 GEO. L.J. 351 
(1992). 
 59. For a discussion of the “costs” of absolute tolerance of speech and how society’s 
tolerance of extremist speech may become an excuse for excessive intolerance in other ar-
eas, see LEE C. BOLLINGER, THE TOLERANT SOCIETY 58-75 (1986).  
 60. Even our highest court has acknowledged that the “particular character of the 
Klan’s activities, involving acts of unlawful intimidation and violence” warrants the allow-
ance of some intrusion into the First Amendment veil if the government can establish a 
compelling justification for so doing. NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 465 (1958). 
870  FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 30:857 
 
mission of racists to the bar.61 As Derrick Bell and Charles Lawrence 
have pointed out, it is not uncommon for the white majority to sacri-
fice the constitutional rights of non-whites in order to preserve the 
interests of the majority.62 In this case, the most obvious beneficiaries 
of a judicial system free of white supremacist administrators are 
people of color and perhaps Jews. However, excluding white su-
premacists from the legal profession will benefit all of us, not just 
people of color. The benefit to whites in yielding First Amendment 
liberty in this context will be a system of justice that is less contami-
nated with racism. Why should whites desire a justice system less 
contaminated by racism? What benefits to whites would be derived 
by such a system? The system would be more efficient and effective 
because race would become less of a factor in administering justice. 
For example, if Mark Furman had not been a racist police officer, 
O.J. Simpson would probably be in prison now. By allowing a racist 
to enforce our laws, society paid a price—we allowed racism to create 
reasonable doubt in the minds of the jurors. A racist police officer has 
a motive to frame a black63 man, whereas a fair-minded police officer 
has no more motive to frame a black man than any other person. 
Thus, a system of justice not administered by racists makes it less 
likely that actions of administrators will be questioned as being ra-
cially motivated64 and more likely that the actions of our lawyers will 
                                                                                                                    
 61. Charles R. Lawrence III, If He Hollers Let Him Go: Regulating Racist Speech on 
Campus, 1990 DUKE L.J. 431, 478 (arguing that some civil libertarians minimalize the 
harm to victims of racist speech by characterizing racial harassment as isolated incidents 
in an otherwise racism-free community). 
 62. See id. at 475 (citing BELL, supra note 46, at 30). 
 63. In this Article, I sometimes use the terms “black” and “African-American” inter-
changeably to refer to people of African descent. I elect to use the term “black” rather than 
African-American in most instances because “black” is broader in the sense that it encom-
passes people of African heritage who may not be American, but who nonetheless experi-
ence racism in America. 
 64. Examples of challenges to decisions rendered by our system of justice on the basis 
of perceived racism abound. See RANDALL KENNEDY, NIGGER: THE STRANGE CAREER OF A 
TROUBLESOME WORD 61-63 (2002) (discussing cases in which decisions of judges have been 
overturned due to the judges’ use of the “N” word and citing United States v. Brown, 539 
F.2d 467, 468 (5th Cir. 1976)). Kennedy also discusses the removal of an elected district at-
torney for his use of the “N” word. Id. at 65-72. Kennedy opines that the district attorney’s 
removal was justified because statements he made 
rendered him unfit to fulfill his public responsibility. Such a responsibility en-
tails a commitment to the idea that all people, regardless of race, should be 
treated equally and with respect before the bar of justice. By calling [the defen-
dant] Ray Jacobs a nigger, Jerry Spivey [the district attorney] cast a pall over 
public confidence in his commitment to accord all people due respect regardless 
of race. 
Id. at 70-71 (citing In re Spivey, 480 S.E.2d 693 (N.C. 1997)). For a current example of how 
racism in the judicial process creates inefficiency and causes doubt about the validity of ju-
dicial action, see Sara Rimer, In Dallas, Dismissal of Black Jurors Leads to Appeal by 
Death Row Inmate, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 13, 2002, at A24. 
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be perceived as rational, fair-minded decisions. And from that we all 
benefit. 
B.   Lawyers’ First Amendment Freedoms Are Already Restricted 
When Necessary to Promote the Interests of Justice 
 The denial of bar admission to Matthew Hale is neither the first 
nor the only instance in which bar authorities have imposed restric-
tions on the First Amendment freedoms of lawyers. Lawyers already 
surrender some First Amendment rights in exchange for the privi-
lege of administering justice. There are several ethical rules that im-
pose limitations on the First Amendment freedoms of lawyers. The 
rules pertaining to advertising and client solicitation restrict lawyers’ 
First Amendment freedoms.65 These rules restrict commercial speech, 
which is subject to the less stringent tests of time, place, and man-
ner.  
 There are other instances where non-commercial speech of law-
yers is restricted in an effort to safeguard the administration of jus-
tice.66 Rule 3.5 of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, as drafted 
by the American Bar Association and adopted by many jurisdictions, 
provides that a “lawyer shall not: seek to influence a judge, juror, 
prospective juror or other official by means prohibited by law; com-
municate ex parte with such a person except as permitted by law; or 
engage in conduct intended to disrupt a tribunal.”67 The rule ex-
pressly restricts a lawyer’s First Amendment right to free speech by 
restricting communications that lawyers may have with jurors and 
judges. The rule also prohibits speech that is intended to disrupt the 
decorum of the courtroom.68 The rule has a dual purpose, which is to 
prevent prejudice to the adjudicative process and to protect and pro-
mote the impartiality—as well as the appearance of impartiality—
and fairness of the judicial system. Despite constitutional challenges 
to the rule, it has been upheld as not violative of a lawyer’s right to 
free speech.69  
                                                                                                                    
 65. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT Rs. 7.1, 7.3 (2001). 
 66. See id. R. 4.2 (prohibiting a lawyer from communicating with a person whom the 
lawyer knows is represented by another lawyer); see also id. R. 3.6 (prohibiting a lawyer 
from making an “extrajudicial statement” if the lawyer should know that the statement 
would have a “substantial likelihood of materially prejudicing an adjudicative proceeding”); 
id. R. 3.8(g) (supplementing Rule 3.6 by precluding a prosecutor from making an extrajudi-
cial statement that would have a “substantial likelihood of heightening public condemna-
tion of the accused”). 
 67. Id. R. 3.5. 
 68. See State v. Swisher, 676 S.W.2d 576 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1984) (providing an ex-
ample of how a lawyer may be sanctioned by the court for speaking in court when said 
speech disrupts the decorum of the court). 
 69. Comm’n for Lawyer Discipline v. Benton, 980 S.W.2d 425 (Tex. 1998). 
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 Likewise, political speech of lawyers is restricted by ethical rules 
in the context of judicial election campaigns. Lawyers who are candi-
dates for judicial office are precluded from expressing a political posi-
tion.70 The obvious purpose of this rule is to promote the public’s con-
fidence in the rule of law and our judicial system. By prohibiting po-
litical statements of judicial candidates, the state ensures that the 
public views judicial candidates as fair and impartial decision-
makers rather than as political decision-makers. Public confidence is 
essential to our system of justice because our legal system depends 
upon support from the public to maintain its authority.71 The exclu-
sion of white supremacists from the bar serves a purpose similar to 
the purpose of Model Rule 3.5 and the rule governing political speech 
of judicial candidates. That purpose is to prevent racial prejudice 
from affecting the judicial process, thereby promoting the public’s 
confidence in the rule of law derived from the judicial process. A sys-
tem of justice that allows a devout racist to administer justice to a 
citizenry that includes people who are the object of the racist’s hatred 
and discriminatory practices promotes the appearance of unfairness 
in our justice system and will cause a loss of public confidence in the 
system.  
 The decision in Hale is supported also by the decision in Bob 
Jones University v. United States,72 which held that the government 
has a “fundamental, overriding interest in eradicating racial dis-
crimination in education” that “substantially outweighs whatever 
burden [that the] denial of tax benefits” placed on the University’s 
exercise of its religious beliefs.73 Likewise, a state has an overriding 
interest in eradicating racial discrimination in the administration of 
justice that substantially outweighs whatever burden the denial of a 
law license may place on a white supremacist’s freedom of expression 
or exercise of religion. The Hale decision is not censorship. Like the 
restriction on speech in Bob Jones, excluding Hale from the bar is 
merely an incidental restriction on speech. In other words, the state’s 
objective in excluding a racist from the bar is to eradicate racial dis-
crimination in the administration of justice, not to censor speech. In-
                                                                                                                    
 70. See, e.g., CODE JUD. CONDUCT Canon 7, 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ A(1)(b), 
B(1)(c) (West 2002). 
 71. Such sentiments are suggested by the preamble and Rule 6.1 of the Model Rules 
of Professsional Conduct, as revised by the Ethics 2000 Commission and adopted by the 
ABA House of Delegates at its February 2002 Meeting. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT 
pmbl., R. 6.1 (amended 2000). 
 72. 461 U.S. 574 (1983) (upholding an IRS ruling denying section 501(c)(3) tax exempt 
status to the private Bob Jones University on the ground that the university practiced ra-
cial discrimination that was contrary to the public policy promoted by the tax exemption 
for charitable organizations). The university prohibited interracial dating and interracial 
marriage and denied admission or expelled any student who was engaged in such an inter-
racial relationship. Id. at 580-81. 
 73. Id. at 604. 
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cidental limitation on First Amendment freedom is permissible and 
justified when the government regulation furthers a substantial gov-
ernmental interest and that governmental interest is unrelated to 
the suppression of free expression.74 
 Not only is the restriction on speech in the Hale case incidental, it 
is insignificant when compared to the interest that the state is seek-
ing to promote—eradicating racism in the administration of justice. 
The incidental restriction on racist speech in this context is a permis-
sible restriction on speech because it leaves open alternative avenues 
for the white supremacist to communicate his message of racial su-
periority and hatred75 toward minorities. Matthew Hale is free to 
continue to practice his “religion,” hold his beliefs, and say whatever 
he pleases. Moreover, the state’s interest in eradicating racism in the 
administration of justice is compelling and outweighs the individual 
racist’s interest in practicing law. Free speech absolutists, who argue 
in favor of admitting racists to the bar, either do not consider impor-
tant values expressed elsewhere in the Constitution or elevate First 
Amendment rights over other constitutional rights.76 First Amend-
ment rights should not undermine the administration of justice nor 
trample Fourteenth Amendment rights. In First Amendment juris-
prudence, like much American jurisprudence, courts make value 
judgments and determine the confines of the law based on those pre-
conceived values. Unfortunately, protecting the rights of the colored 
minority at the expense of the privileged majority has never been a 
popular cause. Nonetheless, if we value equality and truly want to 
strive to be a color-blind nation with color-blind justice, we must ele-
vate the right of the minority to be free from racial oppression over 
the right of the majority to inflict and/or ignore such racial oppres-
sion under the auspices of expression. The refusal of our courts to re-
strict hate speech is an example of how our system of justice makes 
such value judgments.77 Hate speech, like pornography, has no socie-
tal worth, yet it is valued and protected over the rights of those who 
                                                                                                                    
 74. United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968). 
 75. Matthew Hale, through his use of the WHITE MAN’S BIBLE, admits that the Credo 
of the World Church is to hate “Jews, blacks and other colored people,” but argues that lov-
ing the “White Race” makes hate for the enemies of the white race inevitable. According to 
the WHITE MAN’S BIBLE, those who profess love for their enemies are liars and hypocrites. 
See BEN KLASSEN, WHITE MAN’S BIBLE: CREATIVE CREDO NO. 71, available at 
http://www.creator.org/holybooks/wmb/credo71.html (last visited March 26, 2002) (on file 
with author). I define the term “hatred” as the absence of love. For those who need a defini-
tion of love, see 1 Corinthians 13:4 (New International). 
 76. See Lawrence, supra note 61, at 436-37 (noting that traditional civil libertarians 
do not take into account important values expressed elsewhere in the Constitution). 
 77. See, e.g., R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992) (striking down a bias-
motivated crime ordinance as unconstitutional). Banning white supremacists from the bar 
is easier to defend than banning hate speech due to the unique nature of the legal profes-
sion and the limited and incidental nature of the restriction on speech. 
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are its target to be free from such harm.78  
 To allow a white supremacist to become a lawyer would be to 
privilege the interests of racists over the interests of Jews and people 
of color. The white supremacist masquerading under the guise of the 
strict libertarian asks our system of justice to privilege his interest in 
promoting racism above the interests of people of color and the inter-
ests of our justice system, and he cites the First Amendment as the 
authority for granting such privilege. Meanwhile, Jews and people of 
color demand from our government a system of justice that is not in-
fested with racist administrators who may intentionally and covertly 
sabotage their rights. The resolution of the First Amendment con-
flict, therefore, necessarily lies in determining ab initio whose inter-
est is most valued by the state, or, assuming the interests are equally 
valued, whether such competing interests can be reconciled. 
 Communitarianism is perhaps the most rational mechanism for 
reconciling the competing interests of civil liberties and civil rights.79 
Communitarians believe that, in a rights-based society, rights have 
limits as well as concomitant responsibilities.80 Underlying the the-
ory of communitarianism is the idea that, as members of a commu-
nity, we are morally obligated to undertake certain responsibilities, 
and that these responsibilities may exist without an imminent pay-
back in the form of rights.81 In other words, communitarianists rec-
ognize that individual rights cannot be absolute, but must be tem-
pered by that which is in the best interest of the community,82 which 
in this case is the legal profession and all those who are governed by 
our system of justice. The court in Hale applied a communitarian-
type rationale by choosing first to recognize, and then second to 
value, the civil rights of those who come in contact with the legal pro-
fession, as well as by choosing to value the sanctity of the legal pro-
fession and its goal of administering justice.  
C.   Balancing First Amendment Rights With                                
Other Constitutional Interests 
 The First Amendment co-exists with other rights in our Constitu-
tion—specifically, the Fourteenth Amendment, which obviously was 
                                                                                                                    
 78. See MATSUDA ET AL., supra note 44, at 79.  
 79. Linda E. Fisher, A Communitarian Compromise On Speech Codes: Restraining the 
Hostile Environment Concept, 44 CATH. U. L. REV. 97, 122-25 (1994) (discussing the merit 
of campus speech codes and arguing that in the academic community, justice is attained 
when the institution balances the rights and needs of all of the members who comprise the 
academic community). 
 80. Robert M. Ackerman, Tort Law and Communitarianism: Where Rights Meet Re-
sponsibilities, 30 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 649, 650 (1995). 
 81. Id. at 653. 
 82. Id. at 654. 
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added to our Constitution after the First Amendment. Prior to the 
adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, the United States Constitu-
tion was interpreted to permit essentially all types of racist conduct 
by the states. States were free to adopt laws that furthered the inter-
ests of whites while sacrificing the rights and interests of non-whites. 
The Fourteenth Amendment necessarily restricted the states’ rights 
to elevate the First Amendment rights of whites over the equality 
rights of non-whites. A basic maxim of statutory construction pro-
vides that to the extent that a prior provision of a positive rule of law 
conflicts with a subsequent provision, the prior provision must yield 
to the subsequent provision.83 This canon reasonably presumes that 
the drafters of the rule of law were aware of the prior provision and 
therefore must have intended the subsequent provision to limit the 
prior one to the extent that the two provisions cannot be reconciled.84 
This elementary canon of statutory construction is no less applicable 
to our Constitution than it is to statutes enacted by Congress.85 
States should not permit First Amendment principles to impede the 
state’s effort to eradicate racial discrimination in the administration 
of justice.86 Moreover, the First Amendment should not be used as a 
sword to cut away Fourteenth Amendment rights held by the group 
of people for whom the Fourteenth Amendment was deemed neces-
sary. If a state permits self-proclaimed racists to administer justice 
within that state, the state is elevating the interests of free speech 
over the state’s interest in providing a system of justice free from ra-
cism. The state may also be denying equal protection of the law to 
the group of people who would be the obvious targets of lawyers’ ra-
cism.87 
 Synthesized to their core, the cases applying the moral character 
requirement can be understood to hold that a candidate for admis-
sion to the bar is required to prove by clear and convincing evidence 
that he is honest, fair, and respectful of both the laws of this nation 
and the rights of others. Surely reasonable minds would agree that 
an applicant who advocates white supremacy through such notions 
as racial disenfranchisement, racial segregation, the denial of em-
ployment based on race, and even the deportation of all non-white 
United States citizens does not demonstrate respect for the rights of 
                                                                                                                    
 83. 2B NORMAN J. SINGER, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 51.02 (6th ed. 
2000). 
 84. Id. 
 85. See Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 364 (2001) (restating the 
holding of Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 456 (1976), that the Eleventh Amendment to 
the Constitution is necessarily limited by the enforcement provisions of the Fourteenth 
Amendment). 
 86. See Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 604 (1983). 
 87. This argument is premised upon a group justice view of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment that our current Supreme Court likely would refuse to adopt. 
876  FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 30:857 
 
non-white people, nor a willingness to treat such people fairly. Ac-
cordingly, the unwillingness to deal fairly with non-whites and the 
lack of respect for the rights of such persons that render white su-
premacists such as Matthew Hale deficient in the area of moral 
character as that term has been applied to lawyers means he is 
thereby unfit to be a lawyer. At the heart of the moral character in-
quiry is the desire by bar authorities to ascertain whether the candi-
date is someone who can be trusted with the power of lawyers88 and 
who will treat people fairly so that “justice” is done. Bar authorities 
simply cannot trust that a racist lawyer will fairly administer justice 
to our citizens of color. 
 Supporters of white supremacist lawyers will undoubtedly point 
out that a lawyer need not subscribe to or believe in all the laws of 
our country. A Catholic applicant is not excluded from bar member-
ship because she opposes abortion or the death penalty, both of which 
are legal in our country. Indeed, a lawyer need not support abortion 
rights laws or the imposition of the death penalty in order to be ad-
mitted to the bar. However, neither abortion nor the death penalty 
are core values of the legal profession. Unlike abortion or the death 
penalty, equal justice is a core value of the legal profession. Accep-
tance of and adherence to this core value are appropriate criteria for 
entry into the legal profession. All persons who desire to become an 
officer of the court must subscribe to the core values of the profes-
sion. An applicant who is not committed to equal justice for all is 
necessarily lacking the requisite moral character to become a lawyer 
because that applicant cannot demonstrate that he is fair and re-
spectful of the rights of other people regardless of their race. If the 
applicant cannot demonstrate a commitment to equal justice for all, 
that applicant is not qualified to be an administrator of justice in a 
system of justice that is founded upon and committed to such a core 
value. A lawyer who is anti-abortion or anti-death penalty is quali-
fied to administer justice because her political position or belief does 
not demonstrate a lack of commitment to the core values of the pro-
fession, which are competence, loyalty, confidentiality, and equal jus-
tice for all. A lawyer must respect the rights of our citizenry. Our 
Fourteenth Amendment grants all of our citizens the right to equal 
protection under the law. This right has been interpreted to mean 
that a person is entitled to fair and non-discriminatory administra-
                                                                                                                    
 88. Lawyers have more power than laypeople. Lawyers have the power to initiate civil 
lawsuits or criminal charges and to compel the appearance of witnesses and the production 
of documents. Lawyers even have the power to gain access to certain venues not open to 
the public. 
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tion of the law.89 A white supremacist does not respect the rights of 
other people unless those people are purely white. This lack of re-
spect for the basic human rights of all people, a concept so funda-
mental to most organized governments of the world,90 makes the 
white supremacist lack the moral character required for all lawyers. 
D.   Serving Two Masters 
 The wisdom of Matthew 6:24 is infinite. “No man can serve two 
masters: for either he will hate the one, and love the other; or else he 
will hold to one, and despise the other.”91 Hale’s religious and/or per-
sonal beliefs require him to use his profession and its instrumentali-
ties, principally the courts, to engage in discriminatory treatment of 
non-whites, yet the profession that he sought to enter is charged with 
administering equal justice and prohibits discriminatory treatment 
based on race. In essence, Hale seeks to serve two masters—his rac-
ist “religion” and the legal profession. 
 Lawyers are not merely hired guns who advocate their client’s po-
sition. Lawyers are also officers of the court and thereby public ser-
vants. Even a lawyer who has a “private practice” is a public ser-
vant—the public has entrusted him with the power of being a lawyer. 
It is the public that has awarded him the title “officer of the court” 
and the monopolistic privilege of administering justice. As such, a 
lawyer has certain responsibilities to the public. Many of those re-
sponsibilities are codified in the rules of professional conduct adopted 
by the jurisdiction in which the lawyer practices. The rules of profes-
sional conduct arguably establish the ethical floor beneath which no 
lawyer should fall. The rules outline the duties of a lawyer, which 
range from loyalty to the client to the duty of candor to the tribunal. 
The rules of professional responsibility proscribe certain conduct as 
unprofessional and therefore subject to discipline. A lawyer cannot 
pick and choose which of the rules he or she will follow. Accepting the 
rules and agreeing to adhere to them is an all-or-nothing proposition. 
To the extent that the lawyer’s personal morality conflicts with rules 
                                                                                                                    
 89. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986) (holding that a state that allows a 
lawyer to prevent a black person, on account of his or her race, from serving as a juror in 
the administration of justice violates the Equal Protection Clause). 
 90. See Stephanie Farrior, Molding the Matrix: The Historical and Theoretical Foun-
dations of International Law Concerning Hate Speech, 14 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 1, 5 (1996) 
(noting that the international community has declared that there are certain fundamental 
“Truths,” one of which is that all people are created equal and deserve equality and non-
discrimination). Professor Farrior cites various international human rights instruments 
that convey this declaration, including but not limited to Article 19 of The Universal Decla-
ration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 A(III), at 71, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948), and the Inter-
national Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), U.N. GAOR, Supp. 
No. 16, at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), 999 U.N.T.S. 171, entered into force March 23, 1976. 
See Farrior, supra, at 5 n.21. 
 91. Matthew 6:24 (King James). 
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of professional conduct, the latter wins.92 
 If admitted to the bar, Matthew Hale, like all lawyers, would have 
certain “binding professional role obligations”93 that would directly 
conflict with his personal and/or religious obligations as leader of the 
World Church. Lawyers should strive to promote equality in the legal 
system.94 This aspirational goal of lawyers would be ignored, if not 
expressly violated, by the white supremacist lawyer. More impor-
tantly, the white supremacist lawyer is likely to violate the non-
aspirational rules of law governing lawyers. If an applicant’s reli-
gious canons mandate that the individual engage in conduct that vio-
lates the law of lawyering, that individual is presented with a di-
lemma and must choose which master he or she will serve, for it will 
not be possible for such an individual to comply with his or her reli-
gious canons and be a lawyer if those religious canons command con-
duct that will violate a rule of professional responsibility.  
 Thus, if an applicant’s religious beliefs mandate conduct that is 
contrary to the ethical obligations of an attorney, it is both fair and 
necessary to exclude such a person from the profession for the pur-
pose of preserving the integrity of the legal system as a whole. Mat-
thew Hale was faced with this very dilemma—he wanted to serve 
two masters: the World Church and the legal profession. Hale’s 
sworn pledge to the profession to uphold the laws of this country, in-
cluding the rules of professional conduct, would have been in direct 
opposition to the canons of his church because many jurisdictions 
now prohibit lawyers from participating in discriminatory conduct in 
the management or operation of a law practice.95 Hale practiced a re-
                                                                                                                    
 92. Stephen L. Pepper, The Lawyer’s Amoral Ethical Role: A Defense, A Problem and 
Some Possibilities, 1986 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 613, 618-19 (1986) (arguing that individual 
personal moral autonomy is limited once that person becomes a lawyer). 
 93. See Wilkins, supra note 21, at 1580. 
 94. Phoebe A. Haddon, Education for a Public Calling in the 21st Century, 69 WASH. 
L. REV. 573 (1994) (asserting that lawyers have a professional obligation to promote equal-
ity in the legal system); see also MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT pmbl. (as revised by the 
Ethics 2000 Commission and adopted by the ABA House of Delegates at its February 2002 
meeting). The preamble provides that “all lawyers should devote professional time and re-
sources and use civic influence to ensure equal access to our system of justice for all those 
who because of economic or social barriers cannot afford or secure [adequate] legal coun-
sel.” See also id. R. 6.1. 
 95. CAL. R. PROF’L CONDUCT R. 2-400 (prohibiting discriminatory conduct in a law 
practice and providing in part that a member of the bar in the management or operation of 
a law practice “shall not unlawfully discriminate or knowingly permit unlawful discrimina-
tion on the basis of race, national origin, sex, sexual orientation, religion, age or disability 
in: hiring, promoting, discharging or otherwise determining the conditions of employment 
of any person; or accepting or terminating representation of any client”); see also CAL. BUS. 
& PROF. CODE § 125.6 (West 2003) (permitting the state to discipline any licensed attorney 
who refuses to perform legal services because of the potential client’s “race, color, sex, re-
ligion, ancestry, disability, marital status, or national origin”). Other jurisdictions have 
also adopted anti-discrimination rules. See, e.g., FLA. R. PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4-8.4(d); 
IDAHO R. PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4.4(a); ILL. SUP. CT. R. 8.4(a)(5); MICH. R. PROF’L CONDUCT R. 
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ligion that mandates discriminatory conduct against non-whites. 
Hale’s “religion” forbids him from hiring non-whites and mandates 
that his actions promote white supremacy, not racial equality.96 If the 
bar ignored his commitment and intended adherence to the racist 
precepts of the World Church, it would render the oath that we take 
as lawyers meaningless.97 Lawyers affirm to uphold the Constitution 
and promise to not maliciously hinder the cause of any person. If 
facts in the record demonstrate that an applicant lacks sincerity in 
professing a willingness to abide by the attorney oath, such facts may 
serve as the basis for denial of admission to the profession.98 If the 
candidate for admission is a devout racist who has pledged to do eve-
rything in his power to promote the white race and to subjugate all 
others, bar authorities are justified in doubting that applicant’s de-
clarations of willingness to abide by the attorney’s oath.  
 Ignoring the fact that a bar applicant engages in racist practices is 
tantamount to ignoring the fact that an elementary school teacher 
applicant admittedly enjoys virtual child pornography.99 Does the 
fact that the teacher has no criminal record for engaging in real child 
                                                                                                                    
6.5; MINN. STAT. R. PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.4; N.J. R. PROF’L CONDUCT 8.4(g); N.M. R. PROF’L 
CONDUCT R. 16-300; N.Y. CODE PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY DISCIPLINARY R. 1-102(A)(6); OHIO 
REV. CODE ANN., CODE PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY R. 1-102; R.I. SUP. CT. R. PROF’L CONDUCT 
R. 8.4(d); TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. R. 5.08; WASH. R. PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.4(g).  
 96. The World Church canons preclude a member/believer from hiring African-
Americans. BEN KLASSEN, 2 NATURE’S ETERNAL RELIGION: THE SALVATION (1992) (see 
Chapter 4, The 16 Commandments) [hereinafter THE SALVATION]. In its writings, the 
World Church utilizes the pejorative term “niggers,” which, given its historical usage and 
meaning as well as the context in which it is used, has been interpreted by this author to 
be an intended reference to African-Americans.  
 97. Lawyers in many jurisdictions take an oath similar to the following: 
I do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support, obey and defend the Consti-
tution of the United States and the Constitution of this Commonwealth and 
that I will discharge the duties of my office with fidelity, as well as to the court 
as to the client, that I will use no falsehood, nor delay the cause of any person 
for lucre or malice.  
42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2522 (2000). Any person refusing to take the oath or affirmation shall 
forfeit his office. Id. 
 98. See In re Roots, 762 A.2d 1161 (R.I. 2000) (denying an applicant admission to the 
Rhode Island bar based in part on the fact that the applicant’s racist writings demon-
strated insincerity in professing a willingness to take and abide by the attorney’s oath). 
 99. Absolutists argue that virtual child pornography, which is computer-generated 
images of children engaging in sexual acts, is protected by the First Amendment and is not 
subject to regulation because the pornography does not use real children and therefore 
does not afford the state the same harms analysis as pornography that utilizes real chil-
dren. Child advocates counter this argument by arguing that children are harmed by even 
virtual pornography because permitting such material promotes a culture that often leads 
to pedophilic conduct by those who indulge in child pornography. The U.S. Supreme Court 
recently sided with the more absolutist view by holding that Congress cannot ban virtual 
child pornography. See Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234 (2002) (an opinion 
from which Justices O’Connor, Rehnquist, and Scalia dissented). For an enlightening dis-
cussion of how pornography is the practice of sex discrimination that should not be pro-
tected by the First Amendment, see Catharine A. MacKinnon, Pornography, Civil Rights, 
and Speech, 20 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1 (1985). 
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pornography or pedophilic conduct mean that we can entrust our 
children to this person? Do we cite to the First Amendment to protect 
the right of the teacher to work in our schools? Not if we value our 
children enough to protect them from the risk of harm of a potential 
pedophile. If there are facts in the record that demonstrate that an 
applicant lacks sincerity in professing a willingness to abide by the 
attorney oath, such facts may serve as the basis for denial of admis-
sion.100 Because Hale’s religious beliefs mandate racist discrimina-
tory practices that would violate the rules of professional responsibil-
ity, his beliefs cannot be reconciled with the rules of our profession or 
the oath required by attorneys. Accordingly, this impossibility of rec-
onciling the mandates of the two sets of canons supports the decision 
to deny Hale and other white supremacists admittance to the bar.  
 Even jurisdictions that do not have a rule expressly precluding 
discriminatory conduct by a lawyer may still impose discipline for 
such conduct under subsection (d) of the general misconduct rule of 
the Model Rules of Professional Conduct101 or subsection (5) of Disci-
plinary Rule 1-102(A) of the Model Code of Professional Responsibil-
ity.102 Those subsections prohibit a lawyer from engaging in conduct 
that is prejudicial to the administration of justice. Discriminatory 
conduct by a lawyer is prejudicial to the administration of justice be-
cause it causes the public to lose confidence in the system and it ren-
ders the system unfair.103 Hence, such conduct would violate the 
rules of professional responsibility even in the absence of an explicit 
anti-discrimination rule.104  
 Devilish advocacy could perhaps force one to argue that a bar ap-
plicant such as Hale could legitimately hold these beliefs and still re-
spect the rights of non-whites while practicing law. Hale supporters 
may ask, Why do we assume that Hale will violate the rules of pro-
fessional conduct in his role as a professional? Can’t Hale set aside 
his personal hatred and the World Church mission for purposes of 
                                                                                                                    
 100. In re Roots, 762 A.2d 1161. 
 101. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.4(d) (2001). 
 102. MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY DR 1-102(A)(5) (1981). 
 103. In re Goodfarb, 880 P.2d 620, 621-22 (Ariz. 1994) (finding the judge’s use of racial 
epithets to be prejudicial to the administration of justice because it caused many citizens to 
lose faith in the judge’s judgment). 
 104. See In re Williams, 414 N.W.2d 394, 398-99 (Minn. 1987), appeal dismissed sub 
nom. Williams v. Lawyers Prof’l Responsibility Bd., 485 U.S. 950 (1988) (publicly repri-
manding a lawyer for his use of a racial slur against a Jewish adversary at a deposition 
and holding that such conduct violated rule 8.4(d) of the Minnesota Rules of Professional 
Conduct); see also In re Stevens, 645 P.2d 99 (Cal. 1982) (censuring a judge for repeated 
use of racial epithets that the court found to be prejudicial to the administration of justice); 
People v. Sharpe, 781 P.2d 659, 660 (Colo. 1989) (holding that a prosecutor who used ra-
cially hostile language to refer to a Hispanic defendant violated DR1-102(A)(6) of the Col-
orado Rules of Professional Conduct); Florida Bar v. Uhrig, 666 So. 2d 887 (Fla. 1996) 
(holding that an attorney violated rule 4-8.4(d) of the Rules Regulating the Florida Bar by 
mailing a racially insulting letter to an opposing party who was a minority). 
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practicing law and administering justice?105 This argument makes 
several assumptions that may lack veracity. Perhaps the most inter-
esting assumption lurking behind this question is the assumption 
that Hale could and would set aside his racist beliefs and practices 
while practicing law. By making this assumption, those who support 
allowing white supremacists to be lawyers demonstrate that they 
would rather risk the civil rights of all non-white people before possi-
bly restricting the liberties of a few white people. They also assume 
that the applicant who has adopted racist religious beliefs has done 
so only for purposes of his private life and has decided that his reli-
gious beliefs do not apply to his professional life, or that the appli-
cant can serve both masters—the profession and the religion. Those 
who are serious about their religious beliefs try to apply the com-
mandments of their faith to all aspects of their lives.106 Religious be-
liefs may be at the core of who the person is, and for white suprema-
cists, racism is at the core of their being. Thus, we cannot assume 
that a white supremacist applicant will ignore the mandates of his 
racist religious canons while practicing law.107  
 Assuming a white supremacist did promise to set aside his racist 
agenda while practicing law—and we could somehow be assured that 
this promise was not illusory and would be kept—there would still be 
problems with admitting such a person to the bar. As lawyers, we are 
charged with protecting the public and the image of the profession. If 
a white supremacist is admitted to the bar and thereby given the ti-
tle of “officer of the court,” the image of the profession would be tar-
nished. No longer would officers of the court be perceived by the pub-
lic as fair-minded, respectable ministers of justice. Public confidence 
in the profession would be diminished.108 
 Even if a candidate promised to disavow racist canons while prac-
ticing law, such a promise might be no more than chimerical, and the 
risk of harm is not worth taking. Bar authorities are justified when 
excluding an applicant who poses a significant risk of engaging in 
hidden racial discrimination in the practice of law. Bar authorities, 
like the rest of us, know that a racist agenda can be carried out in a 
                                                                                                                    
 105. In the Hale decision from the Illinois Supreme Court, Justice Heiple seemed to be 
concerned with this possibility in his dissent. See In re Hale, 723 N.E.2d 206, 206-07 (Ill. 
1999).  
 106. Indeed the World Church commandments mandate that Hale apply his racist be-
liefs to all aspects of his life, including his professional life. See THE SALVATION, supra note 
96. 
 107. Indeed, Hale appeared unwilling to disavow the World Church canons even within 
the confines of law practice. Ironically, if Hale were willing to violate the canons of the 
World Church while practicing law, such a willingness to violate his own religious canons 
when doing so would promote his self-interest in obtaining a law license would raise seri-
ous concerns about his willingness to violate ethical canons of the legal profession when do-
ing so would promote his racist agenda. 
 108. See Part IV regarding harm to the profession and accompanying footnotes. 
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covert manner in which pretextual rationales for racist conduct pre-
sent themselves not as pretextual at all, but rather as plausible and 
rational reasons for conduct ultimately deemed race-neutral. Because 
racism can be perpetrated without detection, it poses an especially 
insidious threat to the cause of equal justice. Thus, the challenge for 
bar authorities is to determine who cannot reasonably be trusted to 
follow the dictates of equal justice if admitted to the bar. To deter-
mine whether a candidate for admission to the bar is likely to violate 
an ethical canon if admitted to the bar, bar authorities should look to 
the applicant’s past conduct. If the applicant’s conduct demonstrates 
firmly held beliefs that are incompatible with practicing law, exclu-
sion from the bar is justified. In Hale’s case, the finding was easily 
made. Faced with the evidence of Hale’s active and overt racism, a 
conscientious bar examiner could not fail to conclude that Hale’s odi-
ous personal convictions were at war with the interests and obliga-
tions of the legal profession. Thus, the inquiry is not simply one of 
kind, but of degree. 
 Hale’s supporters overlook the gate-keeping function of the bar 
authorities. The primary responsibility of bar authorities is not to 
punish lawyers who engage in wrongdoing, but rather to safeguard 
the administration of justice and to protect the public from the mis-
conduct of lawyers.109 The process of screening for moral fitness is a 
prophylactic measure to prevent injury to the public and the legal 
profession. “To achieve ‘[t]he greatest protection for the public, the 
courts, and potential clients,’ bar spokesmen have advocated ‘elimi-
nating the diseased dogs before they inflict their first bite.’”110 
Whether a white supremacist or an applicant who has embezzled 
funds from a former employer, the bar authorities cannot determine 
with certainty that the applicant will in fact violate a canon of pro-
fessional ethics if admitted to the bar. Nonetheless, bar authorities 
use such information as an indicator of the applicant’s potential for 
harming the public and/or the profession in an effort to prevent fu-
ture harm to our system of justice, which includes clients, the courts, 
and the image of the profession. The legal profession as a self-
governing body has therefore determined that pre-admission conduct 
can be used to indicate whether an applicant would violate discipli-
nary rules at some point in the future if admitted to practice.111 If bar 
authorities abandoned these prophylactic measures, the profession 
could admit all applicants and theoretically disbar them later when 
and if they violate an ethical canon.  
                                                                                                                    
 109. See Statewide Grievance Comm. v. Fountain, 743 A.2d 647, 650 (Conn. App. Ct. 
2000) (citing In re Durant, 67 A. 497 (Conn. 1907)). 
 110. Rhode, supra note 25, at 509. 
 111. See generally McChrystal, supra note 22. 
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 This approach is problematic for several reasons. First, once ad-
mitted, a lawyer lacking in moral character may commit many viola-
tions of the ethical rules before someone finally reports him to the 
disciplinary authorities. “The vast majority of attorney misconduct 
remains undetected, unreported, or unprosecuted, and bar discipli-
nary authorities have proved highly reluctant to withdraw individu-
als’ means of livelihood. Given the difficulties of ex post policing, en-
try restrictions appear to be a logical means of maximizing public 
protection.”112 Due to the stealthy nature of racism, a bar candidate 
who practices racism and is admitted to the profession is less likely 
to have such misconduct detected than a lawyer who steals client 
funds. Applicants are frequently denied admission to the bar if their 
past conduct indicates that they cannot be entrusted with client 
funds.113 Theft of client funds is a tangible, traceable, identifiable 
form of misconduct that is more easily identified and more easily 
proven than misconduct that is committed in the form of racism. 
Conduct that may appear racist to one person may appear benign to 
another. Moreover, even if conduct appears racist at first blush, it 
can often be explained away by some non-racist, well-reasoned ra-
tionale for the conduct. Hence, it is because misconduct in the form of 
racism or racial discrimination is too hard to detect and even harder 
to prove that the prophylactic measure of denying admission is re-
quired.  
 Because much misconduct goes unreported or undetected, many 
members of the public may be harmed before bar authorities are in-
formed of the lawyer’s misconduct. By screening candidates for ad-
mission, we seek to avoid harm to the public and to preserve public 
confidence in the profession. Accordingly, bar authorities should 
screen out hardened racists to ensure confidence in the legal profes-
sion in the minds of people who question whether the legal profession 
is committed to treating whites and non-whites equally. Taking this 
paternalistic approach of trying to weed out the bad eggs helps as-
sure the public that our system of justice is fair and not corrupt, 
thereby improving the image of the profession and the public’s faith 
in our system of justice. 
                                                                                                                    
 112. See Rhode, supra note 25, at 509. 
 113. See, e.g., In re Mustafa, 631 A.2d 45 (D.C. 1993) (denying admission to a candidate 
for the bar of the District of Columbia because the candidate, while a student in law school, 
embezzled funds from his law school’s moot court program). 
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III.   LAWYERS SHOULD NOT EXEMPT THEMSELVES FROM ANTI-
DISCRIMINATION LAWS 
 Hale informed the Illinois Committee attempting to assess his 
character that he would probably never represent a black client.114 
One should not be surprised that a white supremacist who feels no 
remorse or sense of loss for the death of several non-white people at 
the hands of one of his followers would not want to represent a black 
client.115 One may be surprised to learn that historically lawyers have 
had the autonomy to choose which clients to represent, and that this 
autonomy permitted the lawyer to deny representation on the basis 
of the client’s race.116 Those who argue against a prohibition on such 
race discrimination by lawyers argue that an anti-discrimination 
rule against lawyers would be illusory because it would force lawyers 
to lie about the reason for declining the representation. Indeed, Har-
vard Law Professor Martha Minow acknowledges that in the face of 
an anti-discrimination rule, lawyers are likely to offer pretextual 
reasons to cover up their practice of racial discrimination.117 One 
could argue that there is no problem with Matthew Hale refusing to 
represent black clients because there are other lawyers who will pro-
vide representation to such clients, and therefore the clients are not 
harmed by the denial of representation unless Matthew Hale is the 
last lawyer in town.118 Moreover, it could also be argued that blacks 
                                                                                                                    
 114. See Transcript of Hearing on Application of Matthew Frederick Hale for Admis-
sion to the Illinois Bar (Apr. 10, 1999) at 205, In re Hale, 723 N.E.2d 206 (Ill. 1999), cert. 
denied, 530 U.S. 1261 (2000) (on file with author). 
 115. See Hate.com: Extremists on the Internet (HBO television broadcast, Oct. 23, 2000) 
(on file with author) (featuring Hale’s statement that he feels no remorse when black peo-
ple are murdered). 
 116. See Jennifer Tetenbaum Miller, Free Exercise v. Legal Ethics: Can a Religious 
Lawyer Discriminate in Choosing Clients? 13 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 161, 165-66 (1999) 
(noting that traditionally lawyers have held an unencumbered right to decline representa-
tion, citing CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS § 10.2.2, at 573 (1986)). See 
also CANONS OF PROF’L ETHICS Canon 31 (1908), providing that: 
[n]o lawyer is obliged to act either as adviser or advocate for every person who 
may wish to become his client. He has the right to decline employment. Every 
lawyer upon his own responsibility must decide what employment he will ac-
cept as counsel, what causes he will bring into Court for plaintiffs, what cases 
he will contest in Court for defendants.  
 117. Martha Minow, A Duty to Represent? Critical Reflection on Stropnicky v. Nathan-
son Foreword: Of Legal Ethics, Taxis, and Doing the Right Thing, 20 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 
5, 6 (1998). Professor Minow argues that a rule prohibiting a lawyer from discriminating in 
the selection of clients will force lawyers to lie and proffer pretextual reasons for denying 
the potential client representation. Id. While Professor Minow’s assumption is probably 
correct to some degree, the tendency of lawyers to lie in this situation should not serve as a 
roadblock to protecting the rights of the clientele of the legal profession. If Professor Mi-
now’s reasoning were adopted, we would need to abolish almost all anti-discrimination 
laws, including the rule proffered in Batson, which is frequently circumvented through 
pretextual rationales which Professor Minow accurately labels as lies. 
 118. See Hodes, supra note 19, at 990 (outlining the “last lawyer in town” argument 
and arguing that lawyers have moral autonomy to choose which clients to represent). 
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should be grateful that a white supremacist lawyer would refuse to 
represent them given the harm that could be imposed upon the black 
client by the racist lawyer.119  
 While it is true that lawyers have historically enjoyed the privi-
lege of determining which clients to represent, the public policy pro-
moted by such lawyer autonomy is the promotion of zealous advo-
cacy, arguably because a lawyer will not be as zealous in the repre-
sentation of a client if the lawyer either disbelieves in or disapproves 
of the client or the client’s cause. Lawyer autonomy in client selection 
still exists, but it is not absolute. Limiting lawyer autonomy in client 
selection is not a new or novel concept. Lawyer autonomy in client se-
lection is restricted already by the conflict rules which prohibit a 
lawyer from representing a client when such representation would 
create a conflict of interest between the potential client and an exist-
ing client or the lawyer’s own personal interests.120 Hence, the privi-
lege of lawyer autonomy in client selection must be reconciled with 
both society’s and the profession’s commitment to equal justice for 
all, which translates into a commitment to eradicate racial discrimi-
nation in the administration of justice, which necessarily includes 
the selection of clients. Lawyers should consider only legitimate fac-
tors in declining representation such as the merits of the case, the 
client’s ability to pay the fee charged, and even whether the client’s 
cause is morally repugnant to the lawyer. By way of example, it is 
perfectly reasonable for a lawyer to decline representation because 
the lawyer believes that she will be unable to prove the potential cli-
ent’s case. A lawyer who does not believe that the client’s case has 
merit would arguably not be a zealous advocate for the client. Like-
wise, lawyers are not expected to provide representation without 
adequate compensation unless the lawyer is acting to meet her pro 
bono publico obligations.121 Accordingly, it is reasonable to decline the 
representation of a client who is unable to pay for the services of the 
lawyer. Again, the argument is that a lawyer who is forced to repre-
sent a client without compensation might be less zealous in the rep-
resentation.122  
 Finally, the ethics rules permit discrimination in client selection 
where the lawyer finds the client’s cause morally repugnant. Again, 
the rationale behind this rule is that the lawyer arguably would not 
be able to represent such a client with zeal. Arguably a lawyer who 
                                                                                                                    
 119. Gabriel J. Chin, Do You Really Want a Lawyer Who Doesn’t Want You?, 20 W. 
NEW ENG. L. REV. 9 (1998). 
 120. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT Rs. 1.7, 1.8, 1.9 (2001). 
 121. See id. R. 6.1. 
 122. Kendra Emi Nitta, An Ethical Evaluation of Mandatory Pro Bono, 29 LOY. L.A. L. 
REV. 909, 932 (1996) (outlining the arguments against mandatory pro bono, including the 
argument that it would impede zealous representation by the lawyer). 
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harbors racial hatred for a client would also be less likely to provide 
competent zealous representation for such client. Nonetheless, client 
disdain based solely on the immutable characteristic of the race of 
the client should not be a permissible basis for the denial of repre-
sentation. Rather than argue that racist lawyers will not provide 
zealous advocacy, the legal profession should demand that lawyers be 
capable of providing zealous representation to all without regard to 
race. Those who cannot do so should not be in the profession. Thus, if 
we preclude the admission of racists to the bar in the first instance, 
the profession can uphold its commitment to equal justice for all and 
ensure zealous representation. In other words, if the profession only 
admits persons who are committed to the notion of equal justice for 
all, then the profession need not be troubled by a rule prohibiting 
discriminatory conduct in the client selection process or in any other 
aspect of the administration of justice. Hence, the exclusion of white 
supremacists is necessary to protect the integrity of the profession 
and to ensure compliance with ethical rules prohibiting discrimina-
tion by lawyers in the practice of law.123 Most importantly, though, 
the exclusion of white supremacists should be mandated in order to 
ensure the fair and orderly administration of justice. 
IV.   ADMISSION OF WHITE SUPREMACISTS WOULD BE PREJUDICIAL TO 
THE PUBLIC, THE LEGAL PROFESSION AND OUR SYSTEM OF JUSTICE 
A.   Racism Obstructs the Administration of Justice 
 Politically or religiously inspired conduct that is prejudicial to the 
administration of justice can serve as the basis for denying admission 
                                                                                                                    
 123. Some may find this argument reminiscent of the arguments made in favor of ex-
cluding women from the bar in the case of Bradwell v. Illinois, in which the state argued 
that women lacked the requisite moral character to be lawyers because: (1) they were frail; 
(2) the legislature did not contemplate their admission; and (3) their clients would not be 
able to sue them to enforce their contracts because the law at that time would not enforce a 
contract against a married woman. 83 U.S. 130, 139 (1872) (citing the Slaughter-House 
Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1872), which found that the Fourteenth Amendment applied 
only to State discrimination against “negroes”). The Court held that excluding women from 
the bar did not violate the privileges and immunities clause because the power to control: 
the granting of license to practice law in the courts of a State is one of those 
powers which are not transferred for its protection to the Federal government, 
and its exercise is in no manner governed or controlled by citizenship of the 
United States in the party seeking such license. 
Id. at 139 (citing Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36). Obviously, Bradwell is no 
longer the law since the Fourteenth Amendment was subsequently interpreted to extend 
protection to women. The distinction between white supremacists and female candidates 
for bar admission should be obvious as well. Unlike women, white supremacists are not a 
protected class under the Fourteenth Amendment. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2000) 
(prohibiting several types of discrimination on the basis of “race, color, religion, sex, or na-
tional origin”). Perhaps more importantly, white supremacists pose a more significant risk 
to the public and the administration of justice than the alleged risk posed by women as ar-
ticulated in Bradwell. 
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to the bar.124 Denying admission to an individual whose stated “reli-
gious” mission requires the individual in part to transgress the limi-
tations of the law by refusing to represent or hire blacks,125 for exam-
ple, is not only reasonable, it is necessary to preserve the integrity of 
our entire system of justice. “Maintaining public respect for the laws 
and the courts is essential to the effective administration of jus-
tice.”126 Our profession plays a crucial role in our legal and political 
order.127 Thus, any conduct by a lawyer that decreases public confi-
dence in our legal system should be condemned.128 
 How could a lawyer who regards blacks as inherently inferior and 
undeserving of equal treatment under the law adequately represent 
a black person? Such preconceived notions about the worth of the cli-
ent would “likely impair [the lawyer’s] ability to represent the client” 
and would seriously damage and erode the lawyer-client relation-
ship.129 This argument assumes, of course, that a white supremacist 
lawyer would even accept a black client.130 The Model Rules specifi-
cally allow a lawyer to refuse to accept a court appointment in cir-
cumstances where “the client or the cause is so repugnant to the 
lawyer as to be likely to impair the client-lawyer relationship or the 
lawyer’s ability to represent the client.”131 Moreover, a lawyer has the 
right to control his or her own labor, meaning that a lawyer does not 
have to accept as a client, every person who seeks his services.132 
Thus, a racist lawyer, which I will define in this instance as one 
whose beliefs mandate discriminatory behavior against non-whites, 
necessarily will be more likely to discriminate against a black in de-
termining whether to accept that individual’s case. Since he has the 
intellectual acumen to become a lawyer, he probably will be astute 
enough to offer a pretextual reason for declining to accept a black cli-
ent. For example, Hale could deny a black person representation 
with the explanation that he thinks the case lacked merit or that his 
current caseload or other commitments would not permit the repre-
sentation. These rationales are race-neutral on their face and rea-
sonable. In fact, Hale’s real reason for denying the representation 
may be the race of the potential client. Rather than allow this type of 
                                                                                                                    
 124. See McChrystal, supra note 22, at 74. 
 125. See THE SALVATION, supra note 96. 
 126. Elizabeth I. Kiovsky, Comment, First Amendment Rights of Attorneys and Judges 
in Judicial Election Campaigns, 47 OHIO ST. L.J. 201, 201 (1986) (citing MODEL CODE OF 
PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY EC 1-1, 1-5 (1980)). 
 127. See Wilkins, supra note 21, at 1512. 
 128. See Kiovsky, supra note 126, at 201. 
 129. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 6.2(c) (2001). 
 130. Matthew Hale admitted that he would probably never represent a black client. 
 131. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 6.2(c) (2001). 
 132. THOMAS D. MORGAN & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 
PROBLEMS AND MATERIALS 300 (7th ed. 2000); Monroe Freedman, Must You Be the Devil’s 
Advocate?, LEGAL TIMES, Aug. 23, 1993, at 19. 
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subtle and often unprovable discriminatory behavior, bar examiners 
are correct to not empower white supremacists with a license to prac-
tice law.  
 While some jurisdictions still do not have ethical rules precluding 
lawyers from refusing to represent an individual based on the race of 
the would-be client, this author submits that it is morally and ethi-
cally improper for a lawyer to refuse to accept a matter if that refusal 
is based even partially upon the race of the potential client. Indeed, 
even in the absence of an ethical rule precluding discrimination in 
the acceptance of clients, such conduct may be illegal under federal, 
state, and/or local public accommodation laws,133 as well as 42 U.S.C. 
Section 1981,134 which guarantees to blacks the same right to make 
and enforce contracts as to whites.135 Thus a lawyer who refuses to 
enter into a lawyer-client relationship, which is a contractual rela-
tionship, solely on the basis of the potential client’s race would be 
violating Section 1981.136 This “status-based discrimination”137 un-
dermines the legitimate social purposes underlying the rules regard-
ing client selection. The law governing lawyers has historically per-
mitted a lawyer to choose which clients and causes the lawyer will 
represent. The reason that the law has granted a lawyer this type of 
autonomy is so that the lawyer’s independent professional judgment 
will not be compromised by the lawyer’s personal beliefs and/or mor-
als that may conflict with the client or the client’s legal position.138 
The classic example of such a conflict is the lawyer who is asked to 
represent a person charged with a sex offense against a child. Many 
                                                                                                                    
 133. See Wilkins, supra note 21, at 1575-76 (citing Stropnicky v. Nathanson, 19 Mass. 
Discrimination L. Rep. 39 (Mass. Comm’n Against Discrimination Feb. 25, 1997), aff’d, 
1999 WL 33453078 (Mass. Comm’n Against Discrimination July 26, 1999) (finding that a 
lawyer’s office is a public accommodation under the terms of the relevant Massachusetts 
anti-discrimination statute). For a discussion of whether lawyers should be allowed to de-
cline representation based on the race of the potential client, see Issue One of Volume 20 of 
the Western New England Law Review (1998), which has several essays discussing lawyer 
autonomy in client selection.  
 134. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1981(a), (c) (2000) provides in relevant part: 
All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same 
right in every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be par-
ties, give evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings 
for the security of persons and property as is enjoyed by white citizens, and 
shall be subject to like punishment, pains, penalties, taxes, licenses, and exac-
tions of every kind, and to no other . . . . The rights protected by this section are 
protected against impairment by nongovernmental discrimination and impair-
ment under color of State law. 
(emphasis added). 
 135. Id. 
 136. See Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160 (1976) (holding that Section 1981 of the 
United States Code prohibits private schools from excluding qualified children solely be-
cause they are black). 
 137. See Wilkins, supra note 21. 
 138. See Hodes, supra note 19, at 990. 
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lawyers would refuse this representation because their own beliefs 
and morals are so offended by the alleged offense that they would be 
unable to zealously represent such a client.  
 Lawyers as administrators of justice stand as an instrumentality 
of government. The judicial process itself is viewed as government. 
Lawyers have a government-granted monopoly on the administration 
of justice in this country which gives them power to affect the lives of 
others. Racially discriminatory or racially charged behavior by law-
yers obstructs the fair administration of justice.139 Granting a license 
to practice law to an individual who practices racial hatred and dis-
crimination effectively gives that person more ammunition to add to 
his arsenal to support his personal race war because a lawyer has 
more powers and privileges than he had as a lay person.140 Thus, 
whether a law office constitutes a public accommodation or not, the 
profession’s commitment to “equal access under law” and “justice for 
all” is undermined if an individual lawyer is permitted to refuse to 
represent individuals on the basis of race or other “considerations 
that have nothing to do with either their moral worth as human be-
ings or the legitimate interests of attorneys,” such as the merits of 
the case.141 
 There is precedent for excluding white supremacists from a pro-
fession or occupation. The military has found that active participa-
tion in hate groups such as the KKK is incompatible with military 
service, which requires trust, cohesiveness, and discipline among 
service members.142 While the military is easily distinguished from 
the legal profession due to its status as a separate community,143 the 
                                                                                                                    
 139. See Brenda Jones Quick, Regulating a Lawyer’s Discriminatory Conduct: Consti-
tutional Limitations, 21 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 897, 911 (1995) (citing In re Vincenti, 554 A.2d 
470 (N.J. 1989), in which the court held that a lawyer who uttered racial slurs against op-
posing counsel had undermined the administration of justice). Quick also cites Gonzalez v. 
Commission on Judicial Performance, 657 P.2d 372 (Cal. 1983), which held a judge guilty 
of misconduct because he had made racially discriminatory remarks to a juror and a de-
fendant. Quick, supra, at 911. 
 140. See L. Ray Patterson, The Fundamentals of Professionalism, 45 S.C. L. REV. 707, 
716, 719-20 (1994) (noting the power that lawyers have to control the affairs of others and 
arguing that this power is derived both from the client and the state). 
 141. See Wilkins, supra note 21, at 1581. 
 142. Military Forbids Active Role of Soldiers in Hate Groups, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 12, 
1986, at A25. The military also has limited other activities protected by the First Amend-
ment in an effort to ensure that the military is ready, willing and able to perform its vital 
role in protecting national security. For example, the military found desecration of the 
United States flag by a military service member to constitute the military offense of dere-
liction of duty despite the First Amendment because the military has a compelling gov-
ernment interest in ensuring a respect for duty and discipline among its members. See 
United States v. Wilson, 33 M.J. 797 (A.C.M.R. 1991).  
 143. See Douglas Daniels, Freedom of Hate and Service in the United States Coast 
Guard: Rights vs. Duty, 9 U.S. A.F. ACAD. J. LEG. STUD. 147 (1998/1999) (describing the 
distinction between civil and military law based on the view of the military as a separate 
community). 
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legal profession, not unlike the military, has a compelling interest in 
ensuring that its lawyers adhere to the values of the community, one 
of which is equal justice. Public employers other than the military 
have attempted with mixed success to deny employment based on 
membership in a hate group.144 Thus, police forces that have sought 
to exclude members of hate groups from their ranks have only been 
successful when the hate groups in question had been involved in the 
commission of violent crimes.145 
B.   The Parade of Horribles 
 A license to practice law is broad and unrestricted. Once admitted 
to the bar, an individual can pursue many areas of practice, includ-
ing public service. Indeed, if admitted to the bar, Hale or any other 
white supremacist could seek a position as a criminal prosecutor. 
Criminal prosecutors have broad discretion, ranging from the powers 
to determine who to prosecute and what charges to bring against the 
accused to the powers to offer a plea bargain or downgrade charges. 
Already there are questions of whether white prosecutors who claim 
to be objective are subconsciously abusing this discretionary power in 
implementing the criminal justice process.146  
 Because prosecutors have such broad discretion and power over 
the lives of people who become a part of our criminal justice system, 
a white supremacist cast in such a role would have the power to im-
plement his racist agenda by race-based exercises of discretion in the 
charging function, plea bargaining process, and in sentencing rec-
ommendation. For example, a white supremacist prosecutor could 
choose to prosecute all blacks charged with a crime to the fullest de-
                                                                                                                    
 144. Id. Daniels acknowledges that police and firefighters restrict active membership 
in hate groups such as the KKK in an effort to avoid biased treatment of those who depend 
on the crucial services provided by these professions. Id. at 157 (citing McMullen v. Carson, 
568 F. Supp. 937 (M.D. Fla. 1983), in which dismissal of police officer based on officer’s ac-
tive membership in the KKK was upheld). Daniels defines biased treatment by police offi-
cers as including unlawful apprehension and/or assault on the basis of race and points to 
the Rodney King tragedy as evidence of the harm that racist police officers are able to in-
flict. Id. Daniels also points to an incident wherein a firefighter was charged with inten-
tionally allowing two black children to die in a fire to demonstrate the nature and severity 
of harm that racists in the ranks of the fire department may cause. Id. at 157.  
 145. See Young v. City of Louisville, 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 22647 (Aug. 31, 1993) (cit-
ing McMullen v. Carson, 754 F.2d 936 (11th Cir. 1985)). 
 146. The disproportionate number of black men who are prosecuted, convicted, and 
sent to jail in this country, along with racist guidelines and practices uncovered in some 
prosecutors’ offices and contextualized by our racist history, have caused many lawyers 
and scholars to opine that our criminal justice system is racially biased. See Anthony Al-
fieri, Prosecuting Race, 48 DUKE L.J. 1157 (1999); Angela Davis, Prosecution and Race: The 
Power and Privilege of Discretion, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 13 (1998); Sheri Johnson, Uncon-
scious Racism and Criminal Law, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 1016 (1988); Richard McAdams, 
Race and Selective Prosecution: Discovering the Pitfalls of Armstrong, 73 CHI.-KENT L. 
REV. 605 (1998). 
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gree possible under the law despite the circumstances of the case and 
could look for mitigating factors to support a decision to charge white 
defendants with lesser charges or not at all. The white supremacist 
prosecutor could also refuse to plea bargain with black defendants. 
On the surface, this refusal could be supported under the law 
through an easily proffered non-race-related rationale, but under-
neath that determination lies the racist belief that blacks are evil 
and undeserving of leniency, a second chance, or even a fair process. 
Such abuse would be difficult if not impossible to prove because the 
law gives the prosecutor this untamed discretion. Not only is the 
prosecutor’s subjective motive virtually impossible to prove, the 
standard of proof that a minority seeking to challenge an official’s 
implementation of discretion must meet is “exceptionally clear 
proof.”147 In this circumstance, the black criminal defendant would 
have no power or legal basis upon which to reject the system’s use of 
the white supremacist as a minister of justice.  
 It is reasonably foreseeable that Hale or any other white su-
premacist would be more inclined than the average lawyer to deny 
black jurors the privilege of serving on a jury, especially in cases in-
volving black criminal defendants charged with victimizing whites. 
After all, the precepts of Hale’s religion mandate that he perform in a 
manner consistent with what he perceives as best for the white race. 
Admittedly, there exists positive law that prohibits a lawyer’s use of 
peremptory challenges to exclude jurors based on race.148 Nonethe-
less, because discrimination is an intent offense that occurs within 
the confines of the perpetrator’s mind, it is relatively easy to camou-
flage the offense as permissible action. Lawyers can frequently offer 
a pretextual reason for excluding a juror that, on its face, is a ra-
tional, race-neutral basis for excluding the juror.149 
 Once admitted to the bar, Hale might even be elevated to the 
                                                                                                                    
 147. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 297 (1987) (rejecting the Baldus study’s evi-
dence of the disparate impact that the death penalty has upon blacks). 
 148. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986). 
 149. See Tracy M.Y. Choy, Branding Neutral Explanations Pretextual Under Batson v. 
Kentucky: An Examination of the Role of the Trial Judge in Jury Selection, 48 HASTINGS 
L.J. 577 (1997) (discussing the problem of identifying pretextual reasons for discrimination 
in jury selection). Examples of explanations that have been accepted by the courts as non-
pretextual reasons for striking minority jurors include too much eye contact, too little eye 
contact, living in public housing, poor attitude, and poor posture and demeanor. See, e.g., 
United States v. Tindle, 860 F.2d 125, 129 (4th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1114 
(1989); United States v. Mathews, 803 F.2d 325, 331-32 (7th Cir. 1986), rev’d on other 
grounds, 485 U.S. 58 (1988); United States v. Forbes, 816 F.2d 1006, 1010-11 (5th Cir. 
1987); United States v. Vaccaro, 816 F.2d 443, 457 (9th Cir. 1987); United States v. Car-
tlidge, 808 F.2d 1064, 1070 (5th Cir. 1987); see also Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765 (1995); 
BELL, supra note 46, at 552 n.20; Douglas L. Colbert, Challenging the Challenge: Thir-
teenth Amendment as a Prohibition Against the Racial Use of Peremptory Challenges, 76 
CORNELL L. REV. 97-98 (1990). 
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bench.150 If Hale were a judge, affiliation with the World Church 
would certainly be problematic because of the restraints on affiliation 
placed on judges by the Model Code of Judicial Conduct, which has 
been adopted in many jurisdictions. The Code of Judicial Conduct 
expressly provides that a “judge shall not hold membership in any 
organization that practices invidious discrimination on the basis of 
race, sex, religion or national origin.”151 Arguably this rule restricts a 
judge’s freedom of expression and/or association under the First 
Amendment in the same manner as Hale’s denial of admission to the 
bar. The lawyer or judge must choose her master; she cannot serve 
both. The commentary to this canon explains the rationale behind 
the rule. Judges in our system of justice are supposed to be impartial 
arbiters,152 and one of the reasons that we give deference to the deci-
sions of judges is because we perceive them as being fair and impar-
tial.153  
 If a judge is also a Klansman or affiliated with any white su-
premacist group, our perception of that judge’s impartiality is im-
paired because we quite logically think that he is unable to be impar-
tial when presiding over matters presented by non-white lawyers in-
                                                                                                                    
 150. The argument that Hale’s racist views would act as a barrier to an appointment or 
election to the bench is not persuasive in light of the political success of lawyers for whom 
a history of racist politics has not been a hindrance to judicial appointment. The case of 
Charles Pickering is instructive. Judge Pickering, who was recently nominated for ap-
pointment to the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit from his current district court 
judgeship, wrote a law review article advocating an amendment to Mississippi’s anti-
miscegenation law to strengthen the law. See Charles W. Pickering, Criminal Law, Misce-
genation, Incest, 30 MISS. L.J. 326 (1959). Many opposed Judge Pickering’s appointment 
due to his allegedly racist past. See Our Opinions: Extremist judge is unfit to sit on appeals 
court, ATLANTA J.-CONST., Feb. 7, 2002, at A17 (noting that Pickering has offered no apolo-
gies for a law review article he wrote in 1959 suggesting ways to strengthen Mississippi’s 
anti-miscegenation law and mentioning his support for a segregationist organization in the 
1970s). But see David Firestone, Blacks at Home Support a Judge Liberals Assail, Feb. 17, 
2002, at http://query.nytimes.com/gst/abstract.htmlres=FB0EI0FE3A5B0 C748000AB0894 
DA404482 (last visited Mar. 16, 2003) (on file with author) (reporting that some blacks in 
Laurel, Mississippi, the Judge’s hometown, do not see him as racist). Despite the fact that 
Judge Pickering’s nomination to the Fifth Circuit was defeated, he still holds a position on 
the bench, and Pickering has since been re-nominated to the Fifth Circuit by President 
George Bush. See Dickering over Pickering, N.Y. POST, Jan. 19, 2003, at 26. This author 
makes no judgment about whether Judge Pickering is a racist, but merely acknowledges 
that serious questions exist regarding his racial views and actions. 
 151. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 2(C) (2001). 
 152. See id. Canon 2, cmt; see also Leslie W. Abramson, Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial 
Conduct, 79 MARQ. L. REV. 949 (1996) (outlining the law interpreting Canon 2 and ac-
knowledging that the Canon requires judges to be fair and impartial). 
 153. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT pmbl. (2001) (as adopted by the ABA 
House of Delegates at the February 2002 Meeting and stating in relevant part that “legal 
institutions in a constitutional democracy depend on popular participation and support to 
maintain their authority”); see also id. R.6; MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 1, 
cmt. (2001) (“Deference to the judgments and rulings of courts depends upon public confi-
dence in the integrity and independence of judges.”). 
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volving non-white litigants or involving issues of race.154 Since all 
white supremacist groups require members to be white, such groups 
without question practice discrimination. One might ask how a 
judge’s passive membership in a white supremacist group affects the 
judicial system if that judge swears that he is ready, willing, and 
able to put his personal beliefs aside for the purpose of fulfilling his 
duties as judge. The judge’s passive membership in a white suprema-
cist organization expresses to the public that the judge approves of 
invidious discrimination against non-white persons. Thus, the judge’s 
affiliation with such an organization manifests bias on behalf of the 
judge, thereby creating the “appearance of impropriety” and dimin-
ishing “public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judi-
ciary.”155  
 The Model Judicial Code also mandates that judges perform their 
judicial duties without bias or prejudice.156 The commentary to the 
canon explains that a “judge who manifests bias on any basis in a 
proceeding impairs the fairness of the proceeding and brings the ju-
diciary into disrepute.”157 Hence, a commitment to non-bias on behalf 
of those administering justice is essential to preserving the integrity 
of our judicial process. 
 Although lawyers, as officers of the court, do not have to meet the 
standard of impartiality that judges do it would seem that they too 
should not appear unfair or tainted by discriminatory beliefs and/or 
affiliations. Lawyers tainted by such discriminatory views would also 
give the appearance of impropriety in our system of justice. As offi-
cers of the court, lawyers have been entrusted with certain unique 
powers. Even if we assume that a Klansman can set his white su-
premacy beliefs aside for purposes of practicing law, do we not still 
have a perception problem from the perspective of the public, which 
has delegated the duty of administering justice to lawyers? Awarding 
a license to practice law to a Klansman would diminish the public’s 
                                                                                                                    
 154. See KENNEDY, supra note 64, at 61 (citing United States v. Brown, 539 F.2d 467, 
468 (5th Cir. 1976), wherein a judge who used a racial epithet was found to have called 
into question his own ability to be fair and impartial). The question of whether an organi-
zation practices invidious discrimination is answered by looking at such factors as “how 
the organization selects its members,” meaning whether the organization arbitrarily ex-
cludes people based on race, religion, sex, or national origin. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL 
CONDUCT Canon 2(C), cmt. 1 (1990).  
 155. Id. Canon 2(C), cmt. 2. 
 156. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, Canon 3(B)(5) (2000), requires judges to per-
form their duties “without bias or prejudice.” In pertinent part, Canon 3(B)(5) states: 
A judge shall perform judicial duties without bias or prejudice. A judge shall 
not, in the performance of judicial duties, by words or conduct manifest bias or 
prejudice, including but not limited to bias or prejudice based upon race . . . and 
shall not permit staff, court officials and others subject to the judge’s direction 
and control to do so. 
Id. 
 157. Id. 
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confidence in the integrity and dignity of our profession, especially 
the confidence of those whom white supremacists deem inferior.  
 Some may wonder why Hale is distinguishable from the rest of us 
who may hold “unpopular” views and bias yet still have the privilege 
of sitting at the bar. Hale’s views are not merely “unpopular,” many 
of them have been excluded from the basis of our social and political 
organization by the Constitution. While I will concede that we all 
bring our own personal bias and idiosyncracies to the bar, none of us 
should be committed to promoting racial discrimination or racial vio-
lence, both of which are promoted by white supremacists. A white 
supremacist, unlike the rest of us, has at the core of his very being a 
burning passion to inflict harm158 upon non-white people. Unlike the 
white supremacist, we, as members of the bar, are committed to the 
core value of equality and justice for all, and we strive to implement 
those notions in our practice despite the fact that we may from time 
to time fall short of our efforts. It is our desire and our effort to 
achieve equality and justice for all that distinguishes the rest of us 
from the Matthew Hales of society. 
C.   Admitting Racists to the Bar Undermines                                    
Equal Protection For All 
 The supreme law of our land, the Constitution of the United 
States, ensures justice for all and equal protection under the law for 
all citizens regardless of their race, creed, or national origin.159 Meas-
ures designed to ensure equal protection in the enforcement of the 
law by the police are necessary in light of the genre of narrative that 
locates and contextualizes our equal protection jurisprudence.160 
Likewise, measures designed to ensure equal protection in the ad-
ministration of justice by lawyers is necessary in light of our history. 
Moreover, such measures are justified by the compelling governmen-
tal interests of ensuring safety and equal protection of its citizenry 
under the law, and are therefore consistent with the guarantees of 
the First Amendment.161 
                                                                                                                    
 158. Harm is not limited to physical violence, but also includes the damaging economic 
effects of discriminatory practices in employment, housing, and other spheres of human ac-
tivity. 
 159. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. 
 160. See Sean Hecker, Race and Pretextual Traffic Stops: An Expanded Role For Civil-
ian Review Board, 28 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 551 (1997) (chronicling the problem of ra-
cial profiling by the police and arguing that the Civilian Review Board could be an effective 
tool for preventing and remedying racial profiling). 
 161. See Robin D. Barnes, Blue by Day and White by (K)Night: Regulating the Political 
Affiliations of Law Enforcement and Military Personnel, 81 IOWA L. REV. 1079 (1996) (ar-
guing that hate group restrictions for police and military members are necessary and legal 
under the First Amendment). 
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 Granting a law license to a white supremacist would violate the 
spirit if not the letter of the Fourteenth Amendment, which man-
dates equal protection under the law. Once admitted to the bar, a 
lawyer becomes an officer of the court in the state in which he or she 
is licensed. In some jurisdictions, lawyer oaths acknowledge this 
status of lawyers by referring to the lawyer as an officer of the state 
or as holding an office within the state.162 Moreover, the Proposed 
Model Rules of Professional Conduct, as proposed by the Ethics 2000 
Commission established by the American Bar Association, has ac-
knowledged the unique status of lawyers by defining a lawyer as an 
“officer of the legal system and a public citizen.”163 It has been held in 
the context of liquor licensing that the state’s issuance of a license 
does not constitute “state action” as that term has been defined in 
Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence.164 Nonetheless, the state’s is-
suance of a license to practice law is distinguishable from the issu-
ance of a liquor license. The licensing of a lawyer has significantly 
graver consequences than licensing an establishment to serve alco-
hol. The licensing of a lawyer makes that person an officer of the 
state and arguably a state actor because that person now has the 
power to administer justice, which is a function of the state. Con-
versely, selling liquor is not a function of the state.  
 Even if a lawyer is not in all respects a state actor, a lawyer has 
the power to transform herself into a state actor. For example, a law-
yer who chooses to work for the government, such as a prosecutor, is 
clearly a state actor for purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
Even a lawyer in private practice may be a state actor when that 
lawyer exercises state-granted powers.165 Thus, by issuing a license to 
practice law, a state is creating a state actor. Accordingly, the act of 
creating a state actor must itself be state action. Even if a lawyer is 
not a state actor, the act of licensing a person to practice law may 
                                                                                                                    
 162. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:13-1 (West 2001) (requiring attorneys to “solemnly 
promise and swear” that they will “perform the duties of [their] office faithfully”).  
 163. Ethics 2000 Report, Preamble: A Lawyer’s Responsibility (as adopted by the House 
of Delegates at the February 2002 Meeting), available at http://www.abanet.org/cpr (last 
visited Apr. 9, 2002) (on file with author) (defining a lawyer as “a member of the legal pro-
fession, a representative of clients, an officer of the legal system, and a public citizen hav-
ing special responsibility for the quality of justice”). 
 164. See Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972) (holding that the state’s is-
suance of a liquor license to a private club did not constitute state action under the Four-
teenth Amendment); see also Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974) (holding 
that a utility company’s termination of service to a household did not constitute state ac-
tion despite the fact that the utility company was engaged in a business affecting public in-
terest, was subject to extensive state regulation, and had a partial monopoly). 
 165. See Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete, 500 U.S. 614, 623-25 (1991) (holding that a 
private lawyer’s exercise of a peremptory challenge in a civil trial constitutes state action 
because peremptory challenges derive from state authority and because the private lawyer 
made extensive use of those government procedures with “overt, significant participation of 
the government”). 
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still be state action because the states are delegating governmental 
power to lawyers—the power to administer justice. States should not 
be permitted to delegate this power to someone who is a known racist 
because to do so would serve to encourage racial discrimination in 
the administration of justice, which states are arguably prohibited 
from doing under the Fourteenth Amendment. 
 Even if licensing a lawyer does not constitute state action and 
therefore does not violate the Fourteenth Amendment, such action by 
the state does convey a message to the public—particularly the non-
white public—that the legal profession tolerates racial bigotry, the 
Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments notwithstanding. Moreover, 
admission of a white supremacist would serve as the state’s conces-
sion that racism is either a benign component of our legal system 
that we all must tolerate, or a benign component of personal charac-
ter not worthy of concern or challenge. Even worse, admission of an 
open and notorious white supremacist by the state might even com-
municate the message that racial inferiority is not a false or evil ide-
ology, but rather one that is open to debate.166 The admission of 
openly racist applicants to the bar would contribute to a racist cul-
ture that promotes the subordination and marginalization of the mi-
nority and heightens the risk that minorities will not receive justice 
and fairness from our judicial process. If the law permits a white su-
premacist to become a lawyer, then the law necessarily contributes in 
a significant way to perpetuating a racist culture.167 Moreover, ad-
mission of a white supremacist to the bar vividly displays that the 
profession is not committed to ridding itself of the patterns and prac-
tices that perpetuate the problem of institutional racism.168 
 Once empowered with a law license, a white supremacist has 
more power to effectuate his racist agenda than he would have as a 
layperson. Thus, by granting a license to a white supremacist such as 
Hale, the state would be indirectly supporting Hale’s racist agenda 
and, through Hale, would be endangering the equal protection rights 
of all non-whites who are subject to our system of justice—or at least 
those non-whites who would encounter Hale in his capacity as a law-
yer. The failure to protect the minority members of the public from 
the racist agenda of Hale or any other white supremacist lawyer 
would elevate the rights and liberty interests of white racists over 
                                                                                                                    
 166. Many free speech absolutists argue that one can never be sure that an opinion is a 
false opinion. See BOLLINGER, supra note 59, at 260 n.24.  
 167. Andrew E. Taslitz, Condemning the Racist Personality: Why the Critics of Hate 
Crimes Legislation Are Wrong, 40 B.C. L. REV. 739, 742 (1999) (arguing that hate crimes 
contribute to a racist culture and create a heightened risk of physical harm to racial minor-
ity groups). 
 168. See Ian F. Haney Lopez, Institutional Racism: Judicial Conduct and a New The-
ory of Racial Discrimination, 109 YALE L.J. 1717 (2000) (analyzing the concept of institu-
tional racism). 
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the rights and liberty interests of not only non-whites, but also non-
racist whites. Absent a law license, one can dismiss Hale as a mar-
ginal individual unlikely to effectuate much harm if he operates 
within the confines of the law, and he will likely be apprehended and 
punished if he crosses the legal line. But when the state grants a 
white supremacist such as Hale a license to practice law, the white 
supremacist agenda is legitimized if not endorsed by the entire sys-
tem of justice. The state essentially would be saying that lawyers do 
not have to believe in or uphold a fundamental principle of our sys-
tem of justice, which is that all persons are entitled to equal justice. 
V.   WHY RACISM? 
 Racism is intimately woven into our traditional social and politi-
cal ordering. Much governmental and social effort in the twentieth 
century has been directed toward eliminating racism from institu-
tional organizations of government. Admitting white supremacists to 
the bar is antithetical to the efforts of the last century.  
 Some may ask why we should be concerned with racism and how 
we can bar racism when the courts of the McCarthy era seemed to 
say that bar authorities cannot exclude candidates for admission 
based on their beliefs.169 The loyalty oath cases of the McCarthy era 
should not be read so broadly. When synthesized, the cases merely 
hold that the First Amendment prohibits a state from inquiring into 
the associations of bar applicants without demonstrating that a le-
gitimate state interest is served by the intrusion.170 In those cases, 
the applicants refused to reveal their beliefs and bar authorities de-
nied admission based on their refusal to answer questions of associa-
                                                                                                                    
 169. Of course, the political belief that was of concern during the 1950s and 1960s was 
the belief in communism. See generally Konigsberg v. State Bar of Calif., 366 U.S. 36 
(1961). For a thorough history of communism and the First Amendment, see Marc Rohr, 
Communists and the First Amendment: The Shaping of Freedom of Advocacy in the Cold 
War Era, 28 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1 (1991). 
 170. In re Stolar, 401 U.S. 23, 28-29 (1971) (holding that “the First Amendment prohib-
its Ohio from penalizing an applicant by denying him admission to the Bar solely because 
of his membership in an organization” or because “he personally . . . ‘espouses illegal 
aims’”). The Court concluded that the question on the application seeking to determine 
whether the applicant was a member of an organization that advocates overthrow of the 
United States government by force violated the First Amendment because “no legitimate 
state interest . . . is served by a question which sweeps so broadly into areas of belief and 
association.” Id. at 30. Likewise, in Baird v. State Bar of Arizona, 401 U.S. 1 (1971), the 
Court held that the state failed to show that asking an applicant to identify membership in 
an organization was necessary to protect a legitimate state interest. Hence, the finding 
that the applicant was barred from admission was reversed. In Law Students Research 
Council v. Wadmond, 401 U.S. 154 (1971), New York had a rule requiring an applicant to 
believe in and be loyal to the government of the United States. The Court held that a state 
could deny admission to the bar if an applicant’s advocacy of government overthrow or 
membership in an organization advocating forceful overthrow was coupled with the “spe-
cific intent” to achieve that illegal goal. Id. 
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tion.171 During this period in history, states argued that they had le-
gitimate governmental interests in knowing whether an applicant is 
or was a member of any organization which advocates the overthrow 
of the United States government by force or whether the applicant 
personally espoused such illegal aims. The Court rejected this claim 
and found that whether an applicant is a communist or advocates 
overthrow of the United States government is irrelevant to his fit-
ness to practice law.172 The rules of ethics for lawyers do not proscribe 
communist beliefs or practices. Unlike communism or other political 
beliefs or ideologies, whether an applicant is a devout racist is rele-
vant to his fitness to practice law for all of the reasons previously 
discussed in this Article. Unlike the racist, the communist does not 
seek to subvert the rights of a particular class of citizens identified 
solely on the irrational basis of an immutable characteristic. Also, 
unlike communism, racism is, in many contexts, proscribed by the 
law.173  
 Moreover, unlike anti-communism or other political beliefs, the 
premise of equality is at the core of the legal profession and the sys-
tem of justice which the legal profession is entrusted to administer. 
The legal profession is charged with the duty of administering justice 
for all people without regard to race or color. Justice for people of 
color is only achieved in a system that is not entrusted to and admin-
istered by racists because racism obstructs the fair administration of 
justice by bringing the non-relevant factor of race into the process. 
Hence, a commitment to racial equality should be a prerequisite for 
admission to the profession. Those who fail to meet the equal justice 
threshold necessarily lack the qualification to become a lawyer. Fi-
nally, unlike communism, racism is a tool that has been used by our 
government in the administration of justice to systematically deny 
justice to a group of people, identified only by their race, in an effort 
to subordinate those people. In light of this history and the perva-
siveness of racism in present-day law and society,174 government 
should take affirmative steps to eradicate racism from the admini-
stration of justice. 
 As for the First Amendment concern, the First Amendment does 
not prohibit a state from taking steps to protect its citizens from 
harm. For those who are wed to First Amendment precedent, the 
                                                                                                                    
 171. In the case of Matthew Hale, who is an open racist, there was no need to inquire 
about his association with a racist group or his willingness to discriminate against people 
based on their race because he openly advocated such practices and is the public leader of a 
white supremacist group. 
 172. See In re Stolar, 401 U.S. at 30. 
 173. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; 7 U.S.C. § 1981 (2001). 
 174. For an intelligent discourse on how race continues to permeate the law and social 
interactions between people, see K. ANTHONY APPIAH & AMY GUTMANN, COLOR 
CONSCIOUS: THE POLITICAL MORALITY OF RACE (1996). 
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First Amendment does not apply to conduct unless it is expressive 
conduct such as burning the flag to make a political statement.175 But 
expressive conduct can be prohibited when the prohibition is not re-
lated to expression.176 Moreover, expressive conduct can be prohibited 
even when the state’s regulation of such conduct is related to expres-
sion, as long as the prohibition is necessary to protect a compelling 
governmental interest.177 The exclusion of a white supremacist from 
the bar is not based solely on his beliefs. In the Hale case, there was 
conduct in the record that supported a finding that Hale did not 
merely hold racist beliefs, but engaged in racist and discriminatory 
activities. This author posits that a person who harbors racist beliefs 
does not do so in the abstract. Racism is a unique narrative that is 
not easily defined due to its multifaceted conformation. It is not 
merely a belief held in the abstract; it is, by its very nature, both be-
lief and conduct inseparably merged like a scrambled egg.178  
 Racism informs and influences everyday decision-making and in-
teraction with others. It is not merely thought; it is a practice. It is 
practiced in ways too numerous to record here.179 Thus, excluding a 
racist from the bar is not an exclusion based solely on his or her be-
liefs, but an exclusion based on the reasonably anticipated conduct 
that the racist will engage in if admitted to the bar. Accordingly, 
unlike communism, racism is relevant to an applicant’s fitness to 
practice law. Knowing the true nature of racism as both a practice 
and a belief, it is not acceptable to confine the white supremacist’s 
racism to “his beliefs” and protect him under the First Amendment. 
It is reasonable for bar authorities to conclude that a white suprema-
cist whose “religion” mandates conduct that violates the anti-
discrimination laws of our country, including the law of lawyering, 
would likely violate those laws while practicing law. 
 The question arises as to whether the white supremacist’s racist 
conduct is expressive conduct, because if it is, it is entitled to a 
                                                                                                                    
 175. See, e.g., Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989) (holding that although the state 
has a legitimate interest in encouraging appropriate treatment of the flag, it may not pro-
mote its view of the flag by prohibiting expressive conduct relating to it by criminally pun-
ishing a person who burned the flag as a means of political protest). The Court pointed out, 
though, that not all action taken with respect to our flag would constitute expressive con-
duct. Id. 
 176. See, e.g., United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968) (announcing the First 
Amendment test for non-communicative conduct). 
 177. See Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 411 (1974). 
 178. Lawrence, supra note 61, at 443-44 (arguing that the inseparability of the idea 
and practice of racism was central to the decision in Brown, which held that segregation is 
unconstitutional). Lawrence further argues that we do not see most racist conduct because 
much of it is considered unrelated to race. Id. 
 179. For a discussion of racism in legal academia, see Pamela J. Smith, The Tyrannies 
of Silence of the Untenured Professors of Color, 33 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1105 (2000). See also 
Peter C. Alexander, Silent Screams from Within the Academy: Let My People Grow, 59 
OHIO ST. L.J. 1311 (1998). 
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heightened level of scrutiny under the First Amendment. The racist 
conduct of a white supremacist is not expressive conduct. The white 
supremacist who adopts a way of life devoted to violating anti-
discrimination laws is not likely doing so to make a political state-
ment, but rather to promote his or her own self-interest in maintain-
ing white supremacy. But even if we accept that the white suprema-
cist is being racist for the purpose of making a political statement, 
the next issue that must be determined is whether a state regulation 
banning white supremacists from the bar relates to the suppression 
of free expression. Banning white supremacists from the legal profes-
sion does not relate to the suppression of free expression, but rather 
it relates to protecting the rights of our citizens, particularly our mi-
nority citizens who historically have been denied rights due to their 
race.  
 Arguably, a ban on white supremacists is related to the suppres-
sion of free expression because to the extent one wants to be a law-
yer, one would not be permitted to engage in expressive racist con-
duct. Nonetheless, even if a ban on white supremacists does suppress 
free expression, it is not unconstitutional under the First Amend-
ment because the constitutional interest that the state is seeking to 
promote—equality—outweighs the racists’ interest in being able to 
practice racism without consequence. Unlike communism or other 
political ideology, racism has a special “juridical category”180 created 
for it within the text of our Constitution. Hence, unlike anti-
communist ideology, the principle of equality or anti-racist ideology 
is embedded in the very foundation of our law. “The First Amend-
ment does not guarantee that other concepts virtually sacred to our 
Nation as a whole—such as the principle that discrimination on the 
basis of race is odious and destructive—will go unquestioned in the 
marketplace of ideas.”181 Nonetheless, the First Amendment does not 
prohibit the state from taking action that imposes an incidental limi-
tation on speech when such action is aimed at eradicating racial dis-
crimination.182 
                                                                                                                    
 180. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. at 417 (discussing the fact that a Texas law banning 
flag burning violated the First Amendment when burning the flag was expressive conduct 
because there is no indication in the Constitution or other law that a separate “juridical 
category exists for the American flag” so as to permit the state to restrict First Amendment 
rights with respect to the flag). 
 181. Id. at 418. 
 182. Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983). 
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VI.   THE TOUGH CASES 
A.   The Reformed Racist 
 What do we do with the applicant who is an ex-Klansman? Most of 
us are continually evolving in our viewpoints and the way in which 
we conduct ourselves. As such, it is imprudent to apply the “once a 
racist, always a racist” standard to an applicant for bar admission. 
Once it is determined that the applicant participated in discrimina-
tory or racist conduct in the past, bar authorities should conduct the 
same analysis they would for any other past conduct reflecting ad-
versely on a candidate’s moral character and fitness to be a lawyer. 
 Bar authorities should consider how long ago the racist conduct 
occurred,183 and whether the candidate has had a clear record of non-
discriminatory conduct for a significant period of time so as to dem-
onstrate reformation or rehabilitation.184 For example, a bar candi-
date who was a member of a racist organization less than two years 
before applying to the bar should not be deemed to have demon-
strated reformation because only an insubstantial amount of time 
has passed since the misconduct.185 A bar candidate should not be 
denied admission for conduct that occurred twenty years before ap-
plying to the bar when she was an impressionable youth. Similarly, a 
bar candidate should not be denied admission for past racist conduct 
when the candidate has conducted herself in a fashion demonstrating 
fitness to practice law over a long period of time. Finally, bar au-
thorities should also consider whether the candidate has accepted re-
sponsibility for the conduct as well as whether the candidate ex-
presses remorse for the conduct.186 Again, it is important to remem-
ber that the applicant bears the burden of proving that she is of good 
moral character, so if the applicant fails to meet this burden of proof, 
denial of admission to the bar is appropriate.187  
B.   The Open Racist vs. The Closet Racist 
 White supremacists are extremists marginalized by American so-
ciety at large. Their viewpoint and political propaganda are “politi-
                                                                                                                    
 183. See In re Prager, 661 N.E.2d 84, 89 (Mass. 1996) (acknowledging that a bar candi-
date who has committed an act reflecting adversely on her fitness to practice law may be 
sufficiently rehabilitated to be admitted to the bar after the passage of time during which 
the candidate’s actions demonstrate good moral character). 
 184. Id. 
 185. In re Mustafa, 631 A.2d 45 (D.C. 1993) (denying bar admission to a candidate who 
had embezzled and repaid funds while in law school since only one year had passed since 
the misconduct). 
 186. In re Zbiegien, 433 N.W.2d 871 (Minn. 1988). 
 187. Konigsberg v. State Bar of Calif., 366 U.S. 36, 40-41 (1961). 
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cally incorrect” and abhorred by most members of the bar.188 And 
while there are those who think that white supremacists should not 
be excluded from the bar based on their status as white suprema-
cists, the decision of the Justices of the Supreme Court of Illinois in 
In re Hale suggests that those justices and many lawyers, especially 
lawyers of color, tend to agree that the exclusion of white suprema-
cists from the bar is beyond dispute. 
 The more challenging question arguably is what degree of racism 
by a member of the bar is permissible. Do persons who are not mem-
bers of extreme hate groups, but who openly express and exhibit rac-
ist viewpoints and practices, meet the requisite moral character 
standard? Such persons I will call “open racists.” The open racist pre-
sents many of the same problems presented by the white suprema-
cist. The open racist is someone that bar authorities can easily iden-
tify as presenting a danger to the administration of justice. Like the 
white supremacist, the open racist would harm the image of the pro-
fession, particularly from the viewpoint of non-whites who are sub-
ject to our system of justice. Moreover, the open racist would present 
the same “parade of horribles” that were discussed with respect to 
the white supremacist. The open racist is likely to engage in dis-
criminatory treatment of minorities while practicing law especially in 
those areas where discrimination is easily masked with a pretextual 
rationale for the negative treatment. As such, the open racist should 
also be excluded from the legal profession under the same rationale 
as the white supremacist.  
 The “closet racist,” on the other hand, is a more difficult case. The 
profile of the closet racist is a familiar one. The closet racist is some-
one who harbors racist views in his heart or the confines of his mind, 
and may express those views around other known racists, but is po-
litically and socially astute enough to avoid the expression of racist 
views in “mixed company” or a public forum. Secretly though, the 
closet racist seeks to effectuate policy that operates to maintain 
and/or establish the political and social supremacy of whites and rev-
els in the opportunity to oppress non-whites and/or maintain the 
status quo of white privilege.189 The closet racist is not facially identi-
fiable as a villain. The closet racist ostensibly proclaims that racism 
is wrong and argues that we should take a color-blind approach to ju-
risprudence. Indeed, she may be an upstanding citizen with no 
                                                                                                                    
 188. It is important to acknowledge that even most free speech absolutists express an 
abhorrence of racism. Nonetheless, they are willing to tolerate it because the alternative 
sacrifices some First Amendment freedom which they apparently value above the right of 
the historically oppressed to be free from racism. See Wendel, supra note 19. 
 189. For a discussion of white privilege, see Stephanie M. Wildman & Adrienne D. 
Davis, Making Systems of Privilege Visible, in PRIVILEGE REVEALED: HOW INVISIBLE 
PREFERENCE UNDERMINES AMERICA 7 (Stephanie M. Wildman ed., 1996).  
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criminal record and instead a record of public or community service. 
He may have no conduct that one can easily identify as racist, and he 
may even have one or more black “friends.” The closet racist arguably 
presents more danger than the open racist because the closet racist 
ostensibly demonstrates a commitment to equal justice while secretly 
looking for pretextual reasons to deny rights, opportunities, and 
benefits to minorities. As such, this person is likely to be a respected 
member of the community, whereas the white supremacist generally 
is not. It is admittedly at this point that the exclusion of racists from 
the bar becomes a difficult rule to apply. 
 The closet racist presents evidentiary challenges. How will we de-
termine whether a candidate for bar admission is a closet racist? Bar 
authorities could ask more probing questions on bar admission appli-
cations and in interviews with the candidate’s references.190 However, 
the questions could not be so overly broad so as to sweep every per-
son who has any level of bias into the net of bar authorities for a 
hearing on whether the candidate is racist. Even if bar authorities 
could ask narrowly tailored questions that stay within the parame-
ters of the First Amendment, it is likely that a politically savvy ap-
plicant will answer questions on an application with politically cor-
rect responses.191 If that is the case, we do not want bar authorities 
conducting investigations into every candidate’s background to de-
termine whether the candidate has ever committed an act that is ar-
guably racist or discriminatory. Such investigations are likely to lead 
to “witch hunts” in which bar authorities affirmatively seek to de-
termine the presence of a racist taint of each candidate for admis-
sion. Even if bar authorities were as lucky as Johnny Cochran in the 
O.J. trial and located audiotapes192 or other independent evidence 
demonstrating the racist nature of the candidate for admission to the 
bar, the inquiry could not cease there. Bar authorities would also 
have to determine whether this candidate’s alleged racial bias is so 
substantial that it would likely preclude the candidate from fairly 
                                                                                                                    
 190. Questions related to racist practices could be posed to both candidates and their 
references. For example, bar authorities could ask, (1) Do you participate in any racially 
discriminatory activities? Explain; (2) Do you practice racial discrimination or differing 
treatment of persons outside your racial group in any aspect of your life? Explain. These 
questions are different from the general communist questions asked by bar authorities in 
the past because racism is rationally related to the fair administration of justice as well as 
the core values of the legal profession. 
 191. Moreover, it is likely that the references provided by the candidate will be biased 
toward the candidate and would express ignorance of the candidate’s racist views or prac-
tices. 
 192. The reader may recall that when O.J. Simpson was on trial for the murder of his 
ex-wife, he was represented by attorney Johnnie Cochran, who introduced into evidence 
audio tapes of police officer Mark Fuhrman using the “N” word to refer to blacks. See 
JOHNNIE COCHRAN & DAVID FISHER, A LAWYER’S LIFE (2002) (discussing the Fuhrman 
tapes).  
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and effectively administering justice as a lawyer. After all, arguably 
we all are racist to some extent because we have been socialized by a 
racist society.193 At the very least, we all have our own biases. Thus, 
the problem is one of degree, and the issue for determination is this: 
To what extent does one become too tainted by racial bias to be a 
lawyer?  
 Given that some scholars have defined us all as racist,194 the ef-
forts of bar authorities could render us all unfit to practice law if a 
clear line is not drawn. Bar authorities could adopt a definition of ra-
cism that would find that persons supporting affirmative action are 
racist against white people and therefore not fit to practice law. 
Likewise, bar authorities could just as easily determine that people 
who oppose affirmative action are racist because they are attempting 
to maintain the status quo of white privilege.195 Clearly, bar authori-
ties should not be targeting proponents or opponents of affirmative 
action.196 Hence, the line should be drawn high enough to afford law-
yers and bar applicants the room to hold and express political 
thought while protecting against a substantial risk of harm to the le-
gal profession and the public it serves.  
 As stated previously, it is likely that the closet racist candidate 
would answer bar authorities’ questions in a politically correct fash-
ion and would assure them that he would not discriminate based on 
race in the selection of clients or any other aspect of practicing law. 
Accordingly, a consumer protectionism rationale for excluding the 
closet racist would not suffice unless bar authorities refused to accept 
the closet racist’s assurances based on a finding that such assurances 
lack credibility due to some independent evidence of racism that cast 
doubt on the candidate’s commitment to equal justice. The best ra-
tionale for excluding the closet racist is the professional protection-
ism rationale wherein we seek not only to protect the image of law-
yers, but also to protect the image of our system of justice so that it 
                                                                                                                    
 193. Lawrence, supra note 32, at 317-24 (arguing that because Americans share a 
common historical and cultural heritage in which racism has played an integral role, we 
are all racist to the extent that this cultural belief system has influenced us). But see JODY 
DAVID ARMOUR, NEGROPHOBIA AND REASONABLE RACISM: THE HIDDEN COSTS OF BEING 
BLACK IN AMERICA 17, 126-30 (1997) (acknowledging that unconscious racial discrimina-
tion, “Negrophobia,” influences the judgment of all Americans, while also discussing the 
different types of racists, including the aversive racist, and arguing that not all persons 
who are influenced by cultural stereotypes are racist because some people renounce cul-
tural stereotypes and develop their own personal beliefs about race).  
 194. Lawrence, supra note 32, at 317-24; see also ARMOUR, supra note 193, at 68-80 
(discussing unconscious bias). 
 195. Wildman & Davis, supra note 189, at 11-20 (acknowledging that whites live their 
daily lives as beneficiaries of privilege created by systematic racism). 
 196. For an enlightening discussion of the arguments in support of and against af-
firmative action, including a discussion of whether affirmative action is racist discrimina-
tion against members of the majoritarian group, see Myrl L. Duncan, The Future of Af-
firmative Action: A Jurisprudential/Legal Critique, 17 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 503 (1982). 
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appears fair, not arbitrary, and color-blind, not racist. This rationale 
alone, however, is not sufficient to warrant exclusion of the closet 
racist from the bar.  
 Accordingly, bar authorities should not affirmatively seek to ex-
clude the closet racist from the bar. Bar authorities should restrict 
their moral character analyses to determining whether there is evi-
dence in the record demonstrating that the candidate for admission 
is so racist that the candidate is unlikely to adhere to the anti-
discrimination laws of our country and/or the rules of professional 
conduct so as to create a significant risk of harm to the population 
served by the profession and of harm to the profession itself. Some 
may argue that a policy that excludes white supremacists and other 
openly racist candidates while allowing the secretly racist candidates 
to practice law does not correct the problem of racism in the admini-
stration of justice. I agree. The problem of the closet racist will per-
sist, but there are other mechanisms for dealing with the closet racist 
that do not involve the rule of law. The law is not the only tool for 
eradicating discrimination.197 Nonetheless, law should do its part. A 
rule excluding open racists from the bar ensures that the severely 
“diseased dogs”198 will be excluded from the profession and will not be 
permitted to use the legal system to effectuate their racist agendas. 
Likewise, the implementation of a policy against racism demon-
strates to applicants, lawyers, and the public that the legal profes-
sion demands non-discriminatory behavior from lawyers and is com-
mitted to providing equal justice.199  
C.   The Mythological Black Supremacist 
 When I told students and colleagues from the majoritarian group 
about the thesis of this Article, universally I was asked, “What about 
the black supremacist? Would your thesis be the same?”200 Intention-
ally displaying a state of ignorance, my reply was consistently, “What 
do you mean by black supremacist? Give me an example.” The two 
most common examples proffered were Al Sharpton and Louis Far-
rakhan.201 As I anticipated, my students and colleagues were compar-
ing oranges with apples. Neither Al Sharpton nor Louis Farrakhan is 
                                                                                                                    
 197. Political power (voting), economic power (spending), and education have proven ef-
fective tools in combating racism. 
 198. Rhode, supra note 25, at 509. 
 199. Admittedly, this policy is similar to the “don’t ask, don’t tell” policy adopted by 
President William Clinton pertaining to gays in the military. See 10 U.S.C. § 654 (2000).  
 200. Interestingly, rarely was this question presented by students or colleagues of 
color. Rather than argue the reason for this, I offer it as something worth pondering and 
leave it to the psychologists to deconstruct. 
 201. Farrakhan has been labeled a “black separatist” by some. See, e.g., Max Curtis, 
Louis Farrakhan: What’s the Big Deal?, available at http:ujs-online.co.uk/magazine 
_Freshers01_louis_Farrakhan.asp (last visited Mar. 26, 2003) (on file with author). 
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like Matthew Hale. Neither Al Sharpton nor Louis Farrakhan pro-
motes or advocates subjugation or marginalization of whites. Rather, 
these figures point to the harm that whites inflict upon the black 
community and call upon the black community to unite and utilize 
what power it has to fight oppression.202 Neither leader reasonably 
could think that blacks are better than or superior to white people 
because one half of a millennium of history and its present-day rem-
nants, including politics and social customs, tell them as well as the 
rest of us otherwise. So even if they do proffer statements proclaim-
ing black supremacy, their statements and actions, like the state-
ments and actions of white supremacists, must not be viewed under 
an anti-historical lens, but rather a lens that accurately reflects the 
nomos in which such statements were made. Such statements could 
only have been made after, and therefore presumably in response to, 
the social, political, and legal institutions which had already firmly 
established, through hundreds of years of laws and social custom, 
that blacks are inferior in the eyes of the law and society.   
 While I am inclined to agree with the argument that the “black 
supremacist” is a mythological being that has yet to be seen, I am 
compelled to acknowledge the underlying question which is at the 
heart of the majoritarian concern. The majoritarian question regard-
ing the black supremacist assumes that blacks can be racist against 
whites. Indeed, critical race theorists have attacked this presumption 
and quite persuasively argued that blacks, at least on the group 
level, do not have the requisite power to “race” whites.203 While I 
agree with this theory when applied on the group level, it becomes 
less persuasive when applied on the individual level. On the individ-
ual level, there could be a black applicant to the bar who belongs to 
an underground organization or movement that seeks to and is pre-
paring to annihilate, deport, and/or enslave white people. There 
could be a black applicant whose religious tenants mandate that he 
never hire a white person nor have any business with a white per-
                                                                                                                    
 202. See NBC interview with Minister Farrakhan, available at http://www.abbc2.com/ 
islam/english/toread/farnbc.htm (last visited Mar. 16, 2003) (wherein Minister Farrakhan 
stated his position as being based on the notions of “equity and reciprocity”). Referring to 
black people, Minister Farrakhan stated, “We cannot allow ourselves to be controlled by 
any outside group. We must take control of our own destiny. That is what I preach, and 
that is what I believe, and that is what I’m striving for.” Id. See also Transcript from Min-
ister Louis Farrakhan’s Remarks at the Million Man March, Oct. 17, 1995, available at 
http://www.cnn.com/US/9510/megamarch/10-16/transcript/index.html (last visited Mar. 16, 
2003) (saying among other things that “white supremacy has to die in order for humanity 
to live” and challenging blacks to be productive members of society by saying, “Black man, 
you don’t have to bash white people, all we gotta do is go back home and turn our commu-
nities into productive places.”) 
 203. JOE R. FEAGIN & HERNAN VERA, WHITE RACISM: THE BASICS ix-x (1995). 
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son.204 If this is in fact the black applicant’s agenda, such an appli-
cant could also harm the legal profession. The extent and gravity of 
the harm is likely to be less than the harm that a white supremacist 
could impose because the system of justice will be more circumspect 
of a black lawyer’s actions than a white lawyer’s actions because his-
tory has demonstrated that blacks lack the credibility of whites in 
our system of justice,205 and because our system of justice is predomi-
nately white, which makes it a place where the white supremacist 
can more easily operate “under cover” while the black lawyer stands 
out like the proverbial “fly in buttermilk.”  
 Nonetheless, the harm that a black supremacist/separatist lawyer 
could impose on the system is not so de minimis as to justify his ad-
mission. If the black separatist is more likely than the average law-
yer to violate the rights of a white person, as well as the laws of 
lawyering, he too is a threat to the administration of justice and 
should be excluded from the bar. It should be noted, however, that 
the black separatist would have a diminished impact on the profes-
sion because the profession is not controlled by his racial group, but 
rather by the majoritarian group. Thus, it is unlikely that the black 
separatist will be admitted by the majoritarian-controlled bar, which 
could likely find some other reason to exclude the candidate other 
that his racist beliefs. Even if admitted, the black separatist would 
find few allies in the majoritarian-dominated profession and would 
likely have a difficult time being appointed to a position such as 
prosecutor or judge since it is predominately the majoritarian group 
that controls such appointments. Thus, while the harm that the 
black separatist could impose is intolerable to this author, it is likely 
to be significantly less than the potential harm that could be imposed 
by the white supremacist who, although not accepted by the majori-
tarian group, is less feared than the black separatist. 
                                                                                                                    
 204. Such blacks are frequently referred to as black separatists, not black suprema-
cists, because they preach separatism—blacks living apart from white society in order to 
escape racism and white supremacy. The separatist movement also preaches black pride, 
which is an effort to motivate a disenfranchised and oppressed group of people. The black 
separatist movement seems quite distinguishable from the white supremacist movement 
because the underlying premise of the respective movements is different as well as the his-
torical context. The white supremacist movement developed in response to efforts to 
achieve racial equality, and its agenda seeks a return to the days of segregation, or even 
racial “cleansing” of the non-white races, on the theory that such non-white people are in-
ferior and undeserving of equality with whites. The black separatist movement, on the 
other hand, is a response to oppression and has as its agenda the separation of the races as 
a way of self-preservation. This agenda is based upon the historical and arguably present-
day reality that people of color, particularly blacks, have been oppressed by whites, and 
hence the desire to avoid oppression by whites fuels the idea of separatism. In common 
terms, the theory behind the separatist movement is that if the dog bites, one is best as-
sured of safety by staying away from it rather than trying to domesticate it. 
 205. For a persuasive article supporting this proposition, see Sheri Lynn Johnson, The 
Color of Truth: Race and the Assessment of Credibility, 1 MICH. J. RACE & L. 261 (1996). 
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D.   The Unconscious Racist 
 The unconscious racist is someone who does not consider herself a 
racist. She professes disdain for racism and those who practice it. 
The unconscious racist has been defined as the person who does not 
reveal racist tendencies at all, except as “persistent unconscious fan-
tasies.”206 It has been argued that all of us are unconscious racists to 
the extent that we have been influenced by a racist cultural belief 
system.207 We are unconscious racists because we “do not recognize 
the ways in which our cultural experience has influenced our beliefs 
about race or the occasions on which those beliefs affect our ac-
tions.”208 We function on a daily basis by allowing race to influence 
our decision-making process and our value judgments of others with-
out even realizing that we are doing it.  
 The unconscious racist should not be the target of bar authorities 
because the unconscious racist has made a conscious commitment to 
equal justice. The unconscious racist aspires to be a fair-minded, 
non-discriminatory actor. In other words, the unconscious racist has 
made a commitment to and accepts the core value of equal justice 
even though she may from time to time fall short of her aspirations of 
equality. Bar authorities cannot seek absence of bias; all they can 
demand from an applicant is a commitment to equal justice. This 
commitment should be a criterion for determining whether a candi-
date for admission to the bar possesses the requisite moral character 
to be an officer of the court and an administrator of justice.  
VII.   CONCLUSION 
 Racism has taken the form of black slavery in our country, which 
was remedied by the Thirteenth Amendment to our Constitution. It 
has also taken the form of denying blacks and other people of color 
the right to serve on juries and to vote, which was remedied by the 
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments to our Constitution. Finally, 
racism has taken the form of denying citizens of color the right to eat 
in restaurants and to sleep in hotels, which was remedied through 
Congress’ public accommodation laws. In other words, history 
teaches us that, if allowed, racism can be integrally connected with 
the administration of justice.209 If racism is allowed to remain a com-
ponent of the administration of justice through racist administrators, 
                                                                                                                    
 206. JOEL KOVEL, WHITE RACISM: A PSYCHOHISTORY 55 (1970). 
 207. See Lawrence, supra note 32, at 317-24. 
 208. Id. at 322. 
 209. One need only re-read the decisions in Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1856), 
and Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896), to be reminded of this. For a more recent but 
equally tragic example of how racism can infect the administration of justice, see United 
States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787 (1966), in which three racist officials, with the aid of fifteen 
other whites in the state of Mississippi, murdered three civil rights workers. 
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it will prejudice our administration of justice, just as it has in the 
past, albeit much more covertly and virtually imperceptibly in this 
circumstance. If racist applicants are allowed to become lawyers, 
there will be no group justice for those who are the target of such 
lawyers’ prejudice. 
 Much discussion has been had about the color-blind theory of jus-
tice and the color-blind nature of our Constitution.210 Our highest 
Court has espoused the view that our society should strive to achieve 
and administer color-blind justice.211 If color-blind justice is the goal 
that the legal profession seeks to obtain, the admission of racists to 
the bar would serve to thwart that effort. Entrusting racists with the 
power to administer justice to non-whites threatens to carry us fur-
ther away from the goal of a judicial system that is color-blind. So if 
color-blindness is the goal for our legal system and not just a catchy 
phrase to be used to promote the interests of whites, then persons 
who seek to use color as the basis to deny our citizens of color full 
participation in and protection under our legal system should be ex-
cluded from the bar. If we learn nothing from the mistakes of our 
past, we are destined to repeat them. 
 
                                                                                                                    
 210. See Wilkins, supra note 21, at 1514-15 (discussing “bleached out professionalism” 
and its link to the color-blind theory of justice and noting that the phrase “color blind” as 
used to refer to the nature of our Constitution was first made famous by Justice Harlan in 
his dissent in Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 557 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting), over-
ruled by Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954)); APPIAH & GUTMANN, supra 
note 174 (arguing that fairness in a color-conscious society demands color-conscious law 
and policy because color-conscious policies are instrumental in overcoming historically im-
posed racial injustice); see also Neil Gotanda, A Critique of ‘Our Constitution is Color-
blind’, 44 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1991) (arguing that the U.S. Supreme Court’s use of color-blind 
constitutionalism fosters white racial domination). Cf. Wechsler, supra note 56. 
 211. For a discussion of the Supreme Court’s “color-blind” jurisprudence, see Jerome 
McCristal Culp, Jr., Toward a Black Legal Scholarship: Race and Original Understand-
ings, 1991 DUKE L.J. 39. 
